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PREFACE
Initial articles of agreement set forth by the National Center for Health
Statistics under contract HRA 106-74-25 charged the contractor with undertaking
activities intended to define and outline a program of research, development,
testing, and action to resolve the major issues regarding confidentiality of data
within an emerging new program—the Cooperative Health Statistics System.
Specifications provided that the project should (1) identify the nature and
character of major issues having an impact on confidentiality in the Cooperative
Health Statistics System; (2) delineate programs or projects directed toward the
resolution of these major issues including evaluation of existing methods and
practices, devising new practices that might resolve or lessen difficulties in the
field, and outlining those areas in which further research or development appears
necessary; (3) suggest directions for training and guidance in making either policy
or operating decisions; and (4) explore the possibility that a portion of the overall
confidentiality problem in the Cooperative Health Statistics System can be
bypassed rather than directly confronted by using techniques and procedures that
yield adequate information while avoiding the risk of disclosing privileged data.
Since initiation of the project, various events, including passage of several
significant laws, persuaded the contractor (with encouragement from the
Government) to expand certain aspects of the original investigation to address the
central objective more fully.
In particular, the expansion takes into account new developments; includes
analysis of factors collateral to central concerns relating to privacy, confidential-
ity, and access to data; and offers a variety of recommendations for policy
positions to be implemented in the cooperative Federal-State-local health
statistics system.
Many persons contributed indirectly to this report. Any brief list of
acknowledgments would be unfair, for it would omit proper credit to some
sources for ideas that have more than one independent origin, and perhaps imply
other views to which the referenced source does not fully subscribe. The author
accepts responsibility for opinions expressed in the report, with deep appreciation
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ISSUES REGARDING CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA
IN THE COOPERATIVEHEALTH STATISTICS SYSTEM





In recent years, and especially during the
past decade, a complex of related and partially
conflicting principles and doctrines has taxed
our ingcmuity. Issues of confidentiality, freedom
of information, and invasion of privacy and their
inter:tctions have received extensive and steadily
increasing attention from administrators, legis-
lators, the courts, the press, students, and
certain sectors of the general public. Theaters of
discussion have varied: legislative bodies; the
courts; public, interagency, and intraagency
committees; formal commissions; conferences;
mticks in professional journals, magazines, and
ncwsptipcrs; regulations and procedural docu-
ments; and voluminous correspondence and
conversation.
This complex of confidentiality, freedom of
information, and invasion of privacy and its
resolution tire critical to society’s wise handling
of information. Recognition of that fact has
brought forth many opinions on these matters.
Yet there is no satisfactory synthesis of this
outpouring as it relates to the Cooperative
Hcitlth Statistics System (CHSS).
A Central Problem
A common viewpoint, which is also that of
the Icading Federal statistical agencies, is that
statistical information is most accurate when it
is secured and handled in such a manner that
anonymity of persons, business establishments,
and individual products is assured. The U.S.
Bureau of the Census, the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), the National Center for Health
Statistics (NCHS), and certain other Federal
agencies have a tradition of giving such assurance
and faithfully holding to their promises. Typi-
cally, a respondent to these agencies is assured
of anonymity by statements such as “All infor-
mation that would permit identification of the
individual will be held confidential, will bc used
only by persons engaged in and for the purposes
of the survey, and will not be disclosed or
released to others for any other purpose.”1
Often this guarantee is underscored by declaring
explicitly that the reported information will not
be used for taxation, regulation, inspection,
investigation, or any other administrative pur-
pose, and will be released or published only in
the form of aggregated statistical summaries.
This policy is based on a priori judgments,
supported by years of experience, that ( 1) the
American public is willing and even demands
that their Govermcnt acquire sufficient informa-
tion to wisely promote the ~cneral welfw-c; (2)
respondents do, in fact, sLIpply acceptably accu-
rate answers to J considerable variety of govern-
mental statistical inquiries when they are assured
that those replies are handled confidentially and
are not used in any way to make administrative
decisions with respect to an identifiable person
or corporate entity; and (3) there is suspicion,
distrust, and a less satisfactory response when
the respondent concludes that his answers will
be used either overtly or covertly to his personal
disadvantage.
Competing doctrines to this tradition of
statistical confidentiality exist. One significant
factor is the presumption that democracy works
best when the public has access to information
used by the Government in the administration
of its programs and activities and in the making
of decisions. Congress has given validity to this
presumption with the passage of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. section 552
as amended by Public Law 93-502), which, with
certain important exceptions, provides for access
to data possessed by the Federal Government.
Another qualifying consideration is funda-
mental to economy of effort and burden on
respondents. If a datum has been reported to
one governmental agency, the better course may
be to permit that agency to transfer the informa-
tion to another agency, under specified safe-
guards, rather than to allow the second agency
to collect the same datum. The Federal Reports
Act of 1942 (44 U.S.C. section 3501) tries to
deal with this matter, although its ability to
reach local or State data is limited.
Another perspective deserving special atten-
tion in the collection, processing, and dissemi-
nation of data is the concept of invasion of
privacy. Definitions of the concept vary. One
view is that privacy is the right to determine
what information about ourselves we will share
with others. Confidentiality and invasion of
privacy are quite separate matters, but they have
intersecting domains. Confidentiality would be
much less of an issue if no topics were consid-
ered private by persons or corporations. If
transmission of information from one entity to
another were totally suppressed, then privacy
would not be a matter for concern.
These competing doctrines–the value of
assurances of confidentiality by leading statis-
tical agencies, the principle of freedom of
information, the economy of use of the same
data by more than one agency for more than
one purpose, and the conflict between “need to
know” and “right to privacy ’’—constitute the
central problem. They are the basic sources of
the issues that confront the CHSS for which ap-
proaches to compromise are sought in this
report. The economy aspect is one of the key
reasons for building a cooperative statistical
system among local, State, and Federal agencies
in the health field. Yet the fact that operating
agencies, especially at the State and local levels,
need to use specific data for various administra-
tive purposes and often identify individual per-
sons or business establishments tremendously
complicates the confidential handling of the
same or allied data by statistical agencies.
Perspectives
Resolution of the competing forces is much
more difficult because the problem is multidi-
mensional. Significantly relevant considerations
are found in the ethical, political, economical,
legal, and administrative disciplines; and effec-
tive operational solutions require successful
handling of a variety of jurisdictional, proce-
dural, technical, and technological matters. This
report discusses each of these perspcct ives.
Analysis attempts to identify certain priorities
among conflicting objectives. However, the key-
note of recommendations is the concept that
policies and procedures should accomplish a
balance among competing goals that are de-
sirable.
Structure of the Report
Chapter II outlines the background and
environment that condition the privacy, confi-
dentiality, and freedom of information complex
with which the CHSS must be concerned. Chap-
ter III presents an abstract and summary of
major conclusions and recommendations. Chap-
ters IV through XVI analyze leading issues and,
in most cases, suggest resolutions of those issues.
These chapters are the main body of the report
and are the basis for the summary conclusions of
chapter III. Chapter XVII discusses more briefly
a number of other important, but less critical,
issues and focuses attention on gaps in the anal-
ysis and on problems that are not fully resolved,





The interlocking fields of privacy and confi-
dentiality are receiving searching attention from
various organizations, The reasons for these
investigations (and subsequent pronouncements)
are likewise varied, and include concern over
data banks and the capacity through computers
to marshall pieces of information; access to
information by officials, researchers, statisti-
cians, or citizens; doctor-patient, scientist-
subject, and other provider-client relationships;
police systems, insurance mechanisms, and other
devices of social control; immunity of certain
classes of information to subpoena by courts or
legislative bodies; the need for increased volume
and detail of data demanded by today’s more
complex social structures; physical security of
confidential information; a person’s inherent
right to privacy; and efforts to clarify distinc-
tions among administrative, statistical, and re-
search uses of data,
Several hundred substantial articles and re-
ports, including at least a score of quite promi-
nent and influential documents, have emerged
from the investigations. Some elements of con-
sensus are developing, but the wide range of
auspices and perspectives are yielding contrast-
ing and conflicting proposed guidelines for
formation of social policy. Inasmuch as statisti-
cal activities and practices are generic conse-
quences of access to and use of data, it is highly
desirable that evolving guidelines include a so-






and with certain other
formal actions that are taking place. However, it
will be helpful to identify three relatively recent
major events—among a number of others—that
have a special significance for confidentiality
issues in the CHSS.
The first event is the passage by Congress of
the Privacy Act of 1974. The Act is a compro-
mise and amalgamation of a number of other
legislative proposals. It is a comprehensive meas-
ure, and its purpose is to provide safeguards
against invasion of personal privacy by requiring
Federal agencies to establish procedures that
insure that a person can learn what personal
information the Government has, why it was
recorded, and how it is to be used. Furthermore,
this Act gives the person some degree of control
over whether he must supply information re-
quested by the Federal Government. The Act
was intended to have primary impact on data
that identify individuals and are used for admin-
istrative purposes. However, through drafting
ambiguities and varying interpretations, the Act
and consequent executive regulations have had
significant repercussions in statistical affairs.
The second situation is the fundamentally
different character of certain confidentiality
matters that arise as the Nation’s major health
statistics system changes from a highly central-
ized Federal operation to a more decentralized
Federal-State-local cooperative enterprise.
Through policy, legislation, regulation, and years
of attention to the issues, NCHS has established
satisfactory procedures for handling confiden-
tiality matters in the tightly controlled central-
ized system. However, the expanded CHSS
introduces new sovereignities, new laws, new
objectives, new procedures, and a greatly en-
larged arena of concern for both the rights of
individuals and society’s need for efficiently
assembled and disseminated data.
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The third factor, which has both influenced The Task Force and this contractor have com-
the contractor’s activities and hasbeen influenced municated frequently. Although neither is .re-
by those activities, is the deliberations and draft sponsible for the recommendations of the other,
reports of the Task Force on Confidentiality this report and the Task Force report do have
appointed in 1974 by the Advisory Committee some common ground in both analysis and
on the Cooperative Health Statistics System. conclusion.
CHAPTER Ill
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND
1. The interlocking domains of privacy,
con fidcntialit y, and informational requirements
arc receiving both extensive and intensive scru-
tiny. Rightfully, the y are subjects of thoughtful
dclxite and varied actions as the Nation seeks to
resolve different perspectives and partially con-
flicting desiderata.
2. The central and most pervasive principle
govmning wise resolution is this: Appropriate
balance must be sought between a person’s
fundamental right to a degree of privacy and
society’s acquisition of information about itself
in order to guide its activities, and, indeed, to
assure its freedom. This principle is consistent
with the basic objective of the CHSS, which is to
develop find maintain systems that provide the
country with the maximum of useful and
needed health information at the minimum cost
in terms of both the rights of persons and
corporate entities and required resources.
3. No single proposition can guide the CHSS
through the confidentiality -dissemination mwe.
The search for balanced guidance must take
simultaneous account of a multiplicity of tenets
tind perspectives, including ethical, political,
Icgd, economical, administrative, and technolog-
ic:d ones. (See chapters IV, V, X, and XI.)
4. Fundamental to productive informational
policies throughout the social sciences are recog-
nition and widespread acceptance that there are
two very different kinds of informational objec-
tives, served by two different kinds of data. One
objective is the collection, processing, transfer,
retriewd, tind utilization of data to deal with
specific persons or other entities. “Dealing with”
encompasses such actions as licensing, registra-
tion, inspection, insuring, training, regulating,
servicing, diagnosing, treating, charging, and
paying,
RECOMMENDATIONS
and, thus, conveys either benefits or
penalties. This class is termed “case-action
data”a in this report.
The other class of objectives and data is
distinguished by the fact that the identity of
individual elements of information—persons,
corporate units, products—has no significance
and accordingly is suppressed. These data are
collected and disseminated for statistical pur-
poses only, which means that they appear in the
format of aggregates, averages, rates, ratios,
percentages, distributions, and other functional
relationships, and never in a manner that permits
identification of individual entities. Typically,
the statistical inquiry or compilation is accompa-
nied by assurance of confidentiality given to the
provider of information, which guarantees that
data will be used for statistical purposes only
(see chapter VII for further delineation of
statistical purposes) and will not be used, in
whole or in part, for regulation, inspection,
taxation, or any administrative purpose or deter-
mination about identifiable individuals; or pub-
lished or released in a form that would identify
individuals. This report advocates the term
“protected data” for such statistical in forma-
tion. The CHSS is concerned with systems for
handling both protected data and case-action
data. The two systems overlap in some areas, but
are fundamentally different and must be gov-
erned by very different guidelines. (See chapter
VI.)
5. Federal law recognizes essentials of the
concept of protected data and gives adequate
protection to data once acquired by NCHS,
a “Case-action data” replaces the term “micro-action
data” proposed earlierby the author.
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when the providers have been given assumnces
of confidentiality. Steps should be taken to
establish further Federal and State statutory
recognition of protected data, and of its distinc-
tive characteristics throughout the CHSS. These
laws and derivative regulations should include
provisions that give protected data immunity
from subpoena by courts or legislative bodies.
Such legislation will facilitate the collection of
high-quality data, contribute greatly to the
production of useful health information, with
minimum risks to and burden on respondents.
Following a study of existing State laws,
NCHS should undertake the drafting of a model
State law on CHSS confidentiality y, which can
serve as both a starting point and a coordinating
influence on an emerging body of State law and
regulations. Action on this recommendation has
been taken. See Model State Health Statistics
Act–a model State law for the collection,
sharing, and confidentiality of health statistics.
6. Assurances of confidentiality once given
must be honored without exception. However,
three prior conditions should exist before assur-
ance is given. (1) Collectors of datia should
exercise restraint in their inquiries; no informa-
tion should be requested unless there is a
definite and real need for it and an intended use
that outweighs risks to the respondents and
costs of processing. (2) Data that are collcctcd
should not be given the shelter of “protected
data” unless such protection is judged essential
to acquisition of quality information or deemed
a privilege to which the respondent is clearly
entitled. (3) The collector should be in a
position to make certain that the promise of
confidential treatment, if given, can be kept
inviolate.
7. If a single agency, such as NCHS, oper-
ating under sheltering legislation, collects a piece
of information directly from, for example, a
household respondent, classifies the information
as “protected data,” and does not transfer it in
identifiable form to any other organization,
protection of confidentiality is relatively easy to
maintain. The CHSS presents a different prob-
lem. It is a network of agencies, collecting a
great variety of information from numerous
sources and disseminating those data in various
ways. In particular, certain components of the
CHSS may, at times, be in possession of a datum
that will be transferred through one authorized
and designated channel for an administmtivc
purpose, while alon~ another, the same datum
may be classified as “protected data” with
transfer and access restricted to statistical pur-
poses only. These differing channels must bc
kept distinct. The terms “protected data” and
“case-action data” refer to how items of infor-
mation are used, whc) has access to them, and
what their purpose is, rather than directly relat-
ing to the items. The rules for transfer of data
throughout the system must be definite, widely
understood, and subject to sanctions if broken,
One prevailing principle is this: If element B of
the system acquires data from element A (who
might be an original or secondary respondent), B
is required to tell A under what authority the
data are acquired, for what general purpose(s),
and who, if anyone, will have further access to
the data in individually identifiable form. Any
further transfer of identifiable data from B to C
must be in accordance with this declaration,
unless a new reIease is obtained from A. (See
chapter VI.)
8. Because the CHSS handles differing kinds
of data intended for different purposes, the
system should contain certain elements of flexi-
bility that permit customized variations of pro-
cedure for controlling selected classes of data.
The system should be an integrated, standard-
ized operation, but not every component of the
system should be conducted in identical fashion.
(See chapter XV.)
9. Unintentional disclosure refers to any
display of data that results in advertent access to
individually identifiable information by parties
other than the authorized custodian of the
data. This situation can occur through careless
publication of information in categories that are
too finely classified, inadequate physical secu-
rity, or linking of files that, in combination,
contain too many descriptors of the individual.
Operational” rules must be established and en-
forced to minimize these risks. However, the
rules should not be so constrictive that they
strangle dissemination of knowledge. Because no
set of precautions can give absolute protccticm
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against sufficiently determined and sophisticated
attacks on secrecy, the CHSS should not at-
tempt a defense against every possible contin-
gency. (See also recommendations 10, 11, and
12 and chapters IX, XII, XIII, and XIV.)
10. Linking of two data files is more diffi-
cult, less necessary, and less useful than many
persons believe. Linked micro data files have
utility at low cost in certain circumstances
where action is to be taken with respect to an
identified person or facility. The linking of
micro-protected data files, however, will not
often result in a benefit in CHSS that is worth
the added risks and costs, or that cannot be
secured by other less troublesome procedures.
(See chapter IX.)
11, The public-use tape, which contains
micro data for elementary units with individual
identifiers removed, provides a highly flexible
analytic mechanism, and is likely to become an
increasingly important device for dissemination
of data. The public-use tape not only can meet
many of the needs for microdata, but, at the
same time, should reduce the demand for
individually identifiable data. Such tapes are
subject to somewhat more restrictive rules for
protecting against inadvertent disclosure than
are necessary for published tabular material. A
cell of a table usually reveals only one or two,
or, at most, very few attributes of the individual
units that contribute to the cell. A microtape,
however, may contain 10, 20, or even more
descriptors of each unit. It is axiomatic that the
larger the number of descriptors, the greater the
risk of positive identification.
12. Various procedures permit acquisition,
transfer, or manipulation of microdata, and yet
make it nearly impossible to identify individual
persons or facilities. These procedures can be
characterized as “avoidance techniques .“ They
are a fertile field for development, and merit
imaginative cultivation. (See chapter XIV.)
13. Whatever systems are developed under
whatever controls, actions in the CHSS are taken
by people, many of whom are employees in the
system. The greatest safeguard the system can
have is a workforce that understands and is
dedicated to the conduction of a program
balanced between providing useful statistics and
protecting the privacy and confidence of those
who supply the information. To this end it is
proposed that a vigorous and continuing training
program for CHSS staff be mounted. (See chap-
ter XVI.)
14. Policy and practice must be guided by
what people think the situation is, as well as by
what the facts are. It is therefore critical that
NCHS and CHSS vigorously promote wide un-
derstanding of the essence of statistical purposes
and the role of statistical information and, in
particular, maintain a public relations program
that allays unjustified fear of imagined potential
harm to individuals from misuse of statistical
data. (See chapter XVI.)
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CHAPTER IV
ETHICAL AND HUMANISTIC CONSIDERATIONS
Interaction of Disciplines
As noted in chapter I, a multidisciplinary
complex that involves ethical, political, eco-
nomic, legal, administrative, and other consider-
ations is of concern. All of these are important,
but the ethical and humanistic factors are
preeminent. The prime objective of the CHSS is
to develop a fund of information that will
facilitate and enhance the planning and execu-
tion of health activities for the ultimate purpose
of improving the health of the population. This
objective requires securing the maximum useful
information with minimum necessary infringe-
ment of the rights of any person.
Personal Rights
An unavoidable conflict between the need
for information and a person’s right to privacy
exists. A good case can be made that a person
has a “right” to expect his government to collect
sufficient data from other persons to be able to
promote his general welfare. Every citizen must
be willing to give up a little bit of his freedom to
live in a free society. In a given situation, it may
not be clear precisely what ethical considera-
tions may dictate. It should be clear, however,
that rights of the individual and humanistic con-
siderations take precedence over less than essen-
tial requirements of society and governments, a
lower dollar cost for a piece of information, or
the convenience of an administrator. When one
is faced with choosing a course of action after
analyzing a situation in terms of cost-benefit
risk, high priority should be given to reducing
the risk to individual persons unless the benefit
to society is clear and of overriding value.
In applying this principle a reminder is in
order. James B. Rulejl in commenting on
complaints by citizens that governments ask and
store too much information about them and are,
thereby, in a position to exercise too much
surveillance and control over them, makes a
series of perceptive observations. He reminds us
that in the British and American democracies,
the overwhelming bulk of governmental surveil-
lance and control exists because the majority
demand services that can be provided only if
appropriate record systems exist. Examples are
Social Security benefits, health insurance, driver
registration, tax assessments, or even oversights
of credit card privileges.
Furthermore, ethical rights are not absolute.
For example, it is argued in this report that an
assurance not to reveal privileged information
must be honored. Yet that promise should be
weighed against an ethical responsibility to
disclose the information in court if disclosure
would save a person’s life.
Informed Consent
A very special problem in the health field
surrounds the question of informed consent, A
widely held view is that when a government
requests data from a respondent and a reply is
not mandatory, the informed consent of the
person is a prerequisite to the recording and use
of a reply.
The NCHS enabling legislation, the Privacy
Act of 1974, and most other guidelines in the
field of privacy and confidentiality put consider-
able emphasis on the doctrine of informed
consent. The general concept is fairly simple: A
wishes to take some action that involves B; A
explains to B what this action is and what its
impact on B may be, and asks B’s permission to
proceed; assuming that B is thus fully informed,
understands, and a<grees, it is said that B gives his
informed consent; A is then justified in taking
the proposed action.
This concept is valuable and desirable in a
free society; NCHS endorses this principle.
However, in medical research, medical practice,
or statistical activities the exact meaning of
informed consent may not be totally clear.
Informed consent presumes that the explanation
of a proposed action is “adequate,” that the
affected party “fully” understands, and that
concurrence or consent is truly voluntary. The
si~ming of a release by the affected party might
satisfy some legal requirement, and still not have
met the requirements of informed consent in a
broader sense, For example, the release given by
a Medicaid patient may involve consequences
that were neither well explained to, nor under-
stood by, the patient, and for which he really
had no option if he was to receive treatment.
In statistical practice there are several special
problems. If response is not mandatory, the
collector should clearly inform the respondent.
If too much of a point is made that the
respondent need not reply unless he wishes,
however, the collector may only succeed in
biasing results through nonresponse, or by ob-
taining inaccurate response. How detailed should
the explanation of intended uses of the data be?
How far should all conceivable impacts on the
respondent be pursued? How much pressure is
justified in securing a response? Categorical
answers to these questions are not possible.
There arc several guidelines, however, that
should result in courses of action that will be
approved by a majority of reasonable people.
1, It is assumed that the inquiry is author-
ized by law, and that there is a definite
social need for the information.
2. It is a fact that identifiable information
will be treated as protected data (as
described later in this report) when the





antes of confidential handli,ng will be
rigidly adhered to.
It is a facthat the chances are near zero
that any respondent will be harmed by
his participation in the survey.
The burden on or discomfort to the
respondent that inquiry and reply may
entail are minimal compared with poten:
tial social gain.
The collector does explain in general
terms the authorization for the survey,
why the data are needed, and, at least,
one specific way in which they will be
used.
In a program such as the CHSS, there
should be clarification of what agencies
and what kinds of personnel will have
access to personally identifiable data, for
what purposes, and for how long,
These guidelines should be supplemented by
a most significant principle. It is proposed that
all persons interested in statistical systems un-
dertake to promote and gain wide acceptance of
this principle. The principle is intended to apply
to protected data to be used for statistical
purposes only, and means that, except during
processing for a restricted time, the data will
never be used, transferred, or displayed in a
form that identifies individual persons or enti-
ties. The principle is that a sufficient declaration
of purpose is a two-part announcement that (1)
states at least one specific intended usc of the
data and (2) warrants that the data will be used
for statistical purposes only. The significance of
this principle is that, beyond some primary
immediate justifying objective, the creation of
“statistics” is an adequate summary of purpose.
All possible future uses of those statistics cannot
be set forth in detail. The principle does imply,
however, that there are no purposes that will
be served through the use of individually identi-
fiable data. It is proposed that, for protected
data, this principle will meet, for example, the
requirement of the Privacy Act of 1974, that
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agencies must “permit an individual to prevent
records pertaining to him obtained by such
agencies for a particular purpose from being
used or made available for another purpose
without his consent.”
This is neither a dodge nor some devious
attempt to bypass a law or other responsibility.
Governmental statistics may be compiled ini-
tially for a single purpose or for a set of
purposes. Once compiled, they belong to the
people, and not only may, but should be used
for any purpose for which they are helpful. The
legal provisions such as the one just quoted are
intended to relate to the use of data in micro-
form: for example, they might prohibit the
record of a person’s age as reported to the Social
Security Administration (SSA) from being used
by a State vehicle commission to deny a driver’s
license. It would be ridiculous to argue that
statistics on number of applicants for Social
Security benefits by age could not be used for
some previously unstated purpose without the
consent of the applicants.
Inconsiderate Inquiry
A word should be said about a somewhat
subtle aspect of data acquisition and use that
could arise in the CHSS. Possibly an inquiry or
an intended use of an excerpt could result in no
real harm to the respondent but could have a
dehumaniiiing impact in the respondent’s mind,
and thus be traumatic.
Respondents should never be asked to sup-
ply information for which there is no authorized
use, particularly if the inquiry is one that
conceivably could entail mental ar+guish to the
respondent. Some authorized inquiries, however,
probably should not be made, because the
utility of the reply is not sufficient to justify the
risk of possible psychic stress. For example, it
would be wise to forego questioning a patient
about his cancer therapy if there was any doubt
about whether the patient was aware of his
diagnosis. The contention that “it would bc
interesting to know “ is not sufficient reason for
asking an embarrassing or sensitive question.
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CHAPTER V
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS
Intent of the Chapter
Ethical issues are central to the privacy-
confidentiality -dissemination problem. A solu-
tion also requires consideration of other factors.
The objective of this chapter is simply to
underscore the importance of political and
economic components of an operating system.
Later chapters suggest legal, organizational, ad-
ministrative, and procedural structures that also
are important.
Political and Jurisdictional Concerns
In a narrow sense, terms such as “politics,”
“bureaucratic,” “local vested interests,’? and
“the Feds” denote a jurisdictional jungle in
which the struggle for power, authority, and
control is ever present. In a more enlightened
context, political considerations imply that at-
tention is paid to the structure with the best
social organization. In any Federal-State-local
program there will be elements of both the
narrow and the more enlightened view. In the
CHSS, largely a technical and service activity,
the broader view should prevail. It would be
shortsighted, however, to plan with total dis-
regard to the presence of a certain amount of
jurisdictional competition. And, indeed, what to
one observer may appear to be petty, narrow
jurisdictional pressure, is to another responsible
support of legitimate political interests in the
very best sense of the term. For example, the
Federal Government might request permission
to examine the statistical collection techniques
of a professional association, or might require an
audit of State use of Federal funds, believing
that these actions are a necessary part of its
responsibility to acquire quality data at reason-
able cost. The professional association or the
State agency, however, may feel such actions are
unjustified questioning of their motives and
capabilities. Furthermore, NCHS and a State
center may disagree about which can be the
most efficient primary collector of a particular
data set. The point is that the preferences of
local, State, and Federal agencies will not always
be identical, and a successful system must reach
workable compromises among those preferences.
Compromises must also take into account the
interests of a variety of third-party groups, in-
cluding such bodies as the American Medical
Association (AMA), American Hospital Associ-
ation (AHA), Professional Activities Study,
Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross, and Blue Shield.
1nteraction of Political and
Economic Concerns
Relationships among providers, collectors,
processors, and users of data must be given at-
tention in any framework. The peculiar circum-
stances of a cooperative Federal-State-local pro-
gram in a very large theater of activity make the
interaction of political and economic arrange-
ments important in the CHSS.
The health industry is a multibillion dollar
activity. More people are employed in the health
industry than in all of the Federal Government;
more than in all of the State Governments; more
than in all of the local governments if schools
are excluded; more than in all agricultural
occupations; more, in fact, than in any other
single industry in the United States, unless retail
trade of all kinds is counted as a single industry.
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The implication is clear: although effective
planning and conduct is dependent upon the
availability of relevant information, it is neces-
sary for a significant amount of data to be
collected from persons and facilities. The large
volume of data required increases the dangers of
invasion of privacy and risks of breaching
confidentiality. The volume also emphasizes the
need to not collect data that is unlikely to be
used; to avoid duplication in collection, process-
ing, and dissemination. However, avoiding dupli-
cation could mean increasing the number of
persons and agencies that must handle datum
beyond the initial collector who gave assurances
of protection to the respondent, and this in-
creases the risk of disclosure.
Efficiency and economy in acquiring and
handling data must be sought throughout the
CHSS. Yet in building this system, care should
be exercised to avoid centralizing any particular
function so that a rigid monopoly is created. A
dynamic, vigorous system must remain flexible
and must be constructed so that quality assur-
ance and cross-checking processes are built in.
This requirement means that more than one
agent often must have access to certain micro-




TWO CIASSES OF DATA AND TWO PURPOSES
Distinguishing Features
Governments and society need information
to plan, execute, and evaluate in a rational
nxmncr. The only source of much of this
information is the behavior, opinions, measure-
mcmts, and records of individual persons and
other entities. Because these same persons and
entities have inherent rights of protection from
invasion of their privacy, a significant conflict of
interest results. The solution is to secure an
appropriate balance between the competing re-
quirmnents for information and protection of
privacy.
Clearly, no single step will produce this
bakmce. However, one key can open the way
towqrd solution: the recognition that there are
two quite different kinds of informational ob-
jectives, and identification of two different
kinds of data that can serve those objectives.
The two kinds of data have distinctive charac-
teristics, are handled differently, and together
yield high levels of needed information with
minimum risk to the privacy rights of individ-
uals .
One informational objective is the creation
of bodies of statistical evidence—numerical in-
formation in the form of aggregates, ratios,
percentages, indexes, and relationships—to be
used for a great variety of purposes in planning,
administration, and evaluation. These purposes
do not, in themselves, require knowledge of
identifiable individuals, establishments, or prod-
ucts. Indeed, such identification usually would
only clutter up analysis if it were offered to the
user. The user needs the aggregative tools of
statistics. When he wishes to see microdata, it is
only to study distributions of anonymous enti-
ties around central tendency values. (A proces-
sor will need microdata temporarily for proced-
ural purposes and quality control, but unit
identification can be removed as soon as
processing has been completed, and separated
from the substantive information.) We are speak-
ing here of the familiar concept of data used for
statistical purposes only, as understood and
practiced by such agencies as the Census Bureau,
BLS, or NCHS. For convenience, we designate
such statistics as “protected data.” These data
have full and absolute protection of confiden-
tiality guaranteed by law, are, in some instances,
immune from subpoena, and are further shel-
tered by legal penalties for those who might
violate the confidential status.
The CHSS is also involved with data that
serve a second objective of great importance: the
more coordinated, efficient collection, process-
ing, transfer, retrieval, and utilization of data for
the express objective of dealing with specific
individual persons or other entities. “Dealing
with” encompasses such actions as licensing,
registration, inspection, insuring, training, regu-
lating, servicing, diagnosing, treating, charging,
paying, and both helping and punishing. It is
suggested that this type of information be
termed “case-action data.” A case-action record
must contain a unique and readily usable identi-
fier of the individual entity to which it refers.
Certain classes of case-action data may be
withheld from most possible consumers, yet
made available to all those persons with a “need
to know.” The physician’s patient record and
certain data descriptive of employees are ex-
amples of information of this type. Other
case-action data may be more widely dissemi-
nated, however, or even be entirely in the public
domain–for example , name, address, size and
nature of business or facilities, or name, unique
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identifier, and occupation of licensed practi-
tioners. In addition to serving their primary
individualized objectives case-action data may
also be aggregated and serve useful statistical
objectives.
The CHSS is concerned with a national
program to develop systems for both protected
data and case-action data. The two systems will
overlap in some areas, but fundamentally they
must be very different systems with different
guidelines. Recognition that they are two sepa-
rate systems rather than a single system is a
major step toward resolution of many perplex-
ing issues. Legislation, policy, and procedure
should carry this distinction into both planning
and operation. In the CHSS, the Center is
concerned primarily with protected data, and
will release other data only when they have been
judged to be properly in the public domain.
Contrastingly, State and local agencies often will
be handlers of both classes of information.
Definitions and Labels
The definitions of protected data and of
other kinds of data need to be given thoughtful
and precise formulation. The term “case-action
data” describes a useful concept. Some may
employ the term “administrative data” for a
similar purpose. The label “administrative
data” is, at once, both too restrictive and too
encompassing. It fails to distinguish satisfactor-
ily from protected data. Protected data have the
fundamental attribute that they shall not be
disclosed or knowingly cause to be disclosed by
the collector or custodian(s) by any means, in a
manner that makes it possible from such dis-
closure to relate the particulars obtained from
any return to any identifiable individual or
entity except with the consent of the provider
of the information. Protected data are utilized
only in statistical format for statistical purposes.
Case-action data are all other data, whether col-
lected in their own right as descriptive informa-
tion or as byproducts of other actions, but not
accorded the full nondisclosure attribute of pro-
tected data. Protected data will be displayed or
released in such aggregated forms as totals,
ratios, rates, and relationships; or if in micro-
format, only with individual identification re-
moved; and, in all cases, for statistical purposes
only, and never for purposes of taxation, re@a-
tion, investigation, or other direct action with
regard to individuals. Individually identifiable
items from protected data sets can only be trans-
ferred to third parties with the consent of re-
spondents. Case action or administrative data
may be used for similar statistical purposes and
can also be used in microform by those with a
clear need to know, or as the holders determine,
if not in violation of any other law.
The above definitions should be established
by both Federal and State statute, at the earliest
practicable date. Pending such legislation, they
should be promulgated as regulations of cogni-
zant authority.
Another facet of these data classes must be
underscored. The terms “protected data” and
“case-action data” refer to how items of infor-
mation are used, who has access to the items,
and for what purposes they are used, rather than
to the specific items. Any particular datum may
be case-action data in one environment or
pathway and protected data in another environ-
ment or pathway. To avoid latent prejudices
about proper handling of health data, consider
an illustration from another field. The circum-
stances in which an original source supplies
information for both case-action through one
channel and protected data along another are by
no means restricted to health matters.
An almost classic example is the handling of
wages and salaries by employers in the United
States. An employer reports earnings for individ-
uals to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and
the SSA for case-action purposes. Both agencies
use the data in restricted ways and take actions
regarding individuals on the basis of the reported
data. Many employers , using the same basic
accounting records, also report earnings to the
BLS., where the information becomes protected
data, and is used for statistical purposes only.
No action is taken with respect to an individual
employee or employer on the basis of the BLS
records, but the Nation gains valuable inf orma-
tion on levels and trends of earnings and




Successful publicity requires a climate in
which this dichotomy of purpose is widely
recognized and respected. Continuing vigorous
public relations activity should have as its
objective the development of public perception
equal to that concerning “top secret versus
other,” or “lawyer-client privileged information
versus ordinary testimony .“
Formal Designation
The term “protected data” should be desig-
nated on all hard-copy documents and other
transcriptions and coded on punchcards or mag-
netic tape. Forms should be printed with “PRO-
TECTED DATA” in large (72-point) block let-
ters. It is possible for one record to be classified
“protected data” and, therefore, sheltered, and
another record containing all or a part of the
same information to have a different status be-
cause of its different context.
Collectors of data have the authority to
desi~nate specific information as protected data,
but only within clear boundaries of authorizing
legislation and regulations. The collector only
assigns such a designation when there are over-
riding reasons for doing so. The designation
must not be overused, and never used as an
excuse for withholding administrative data.
Once a record has been designated as “protected
data,” the designation can be removed only by
the agency that made the assignment. (Legisla-
tion may be necessary to prevent abuse of the
privilege of classifying information as “protected
data.”)
Scope of the Designation
Confidentiality assured to protected data
should not be waived without consent of the
provider of the information. Numerous existing
laws, regulations, policies, and practices give, or
tippear to give, exemptions to promises of con-
fidentiality in certain circumstances. Prominent
among these are:
1. Court orders or subpoena for evidence.






Rights of individuals to have access to
information useful in promoting their
health, or in providing the best evidence
of their defense in legal actions.
Claims of law enforcement agencies–
especially in criminal affairs.
Each of these needs has a social value, as well as
a potential benefit to individuals, However,
these needs can be met without overriding assur-
ances guaranteed for protected data. Protected
data invariably come from a prior provider or
source of the information. That provider or
source should be the point at which courts,
legislators, or administrators seek disclosure
when social interests require identifiable data.
The only exceptions should be situations where
profound ethical considerations outweigh the
guarantee of confidentiality. (See section “Per-
sonal Rights” in chapter IV.)
Notice to Providers
Whenever possible, the initial collector of
data should inform the respondent or provider
of information when information is declared
“protected data.” This task may not be easy;
however, it is important to attempt it with
strong resolve. With rare exceptions, data of an
individual entity are identifiable at the point of
collection. Through editing, processing, tran-
scription, and transmission to other parties the
data are still identifiable. Therefore, policy and
procedures should provide for the separation of
substantive data from the identifiers at the earli-
est practicable point and for notification to the
original provider at the time of collection, if
feasible.
Use of Administrative Records
for Statistical Purposes
Assume that a successful distinction is made
between statistical and other purposes–or
between protected data and case-action data–
and that this distinction is made known to
an acceptable degree to all interested parties,
including relevant sectors of the general
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public. Focus then on that other major area of
the CHSS: the situation in which information is
recorded initially for an administrative purpose,
but may be used additionally for statistical
purposes. At this point resolution of issues of
privacy and confidentiality is most difficult and
subject to the greatest hazards for respondents,
subjects, administrators, and statisticians. Soci-
ety and the CHSS must display ingenuity, care,
and wisdom to secure appropriate balance be-
tween need to know and protection of the indi-
vidual. Under “Definitions and Labels,” at least
two major subclasses of data in this category are
discussed. One subclass consists of items of
information in the public domain-available to
any person as public record. Except for misun-
derstandings, errors, or mischievous actions,
they constitute no serious problem. However, in-~
stances of the other subclass are legion: They
consist of items provided or recorded initially
for some operational or administrative purpose
with the expectation that they will be used for a
particular restricted purpose and that access to
them will be limited to persons with a definite ,
need to know relevant to that purpose. When
they are used for any other purpose, a poten-
tially serious conflict arises.
Many considerations impinge on the latter
subclass. Much of this report, as well as exten-
sive literature, deals with various facets of it.
Three directives are proposed:
1. When administrative data are of good
quality and pertinent to a statistical or
research purpose, a way should be
found, in the interests of cost efficiency
and improved knowledge, to make them
available for that purpose.
2. When administrative data are made avail-
able, the y must not only acquire the
shelter of other protected data but also
retain the full protection they enjoyed as
particular kinds of administrative data.
Any exception to these requirements
must be stated in writing, and any
transfer or use must be governed by a
written protocol that has the force of a
contract, if the transfer is from one
agent y to another.
3. Public perception of the consequence of
a transfer or separate use of administra-
tive data may be as important as the
actual effects. (See chapter XVI,) There-
fore, all affected parties should be
clearly informed of the actions taken,
the actions to be taken, and the possible
impact on initial respondents; or the
action and use should be restricted to
courses that cannot possibly harm af-
fected individuals.
A Policy Position
Whether data are collected originally for a
statistical or an administrative purpose, confi-
dentiality should not be promised unless there
are persuasive reasons for doing so. In some situ-
ations there are compelling arguments for assur-
ances of confidentiality. However, there are
many other situations in which confidential han-
dling of data would unnecessarily restrict use,
and serve no important objective. The burden of
justification for declaring a particular collection
confidential is the responsibility of the collector,
and is not to be taken lightly.
However, when confidentiality has been
assured, it must be honored by those who assure
it. Preferably, their position should be protected
by shield laws–and at the very least by regula-









The previous chapter proposes the concept
of protected data. Throughout this report and
elsewhere, the expression “for statistical pur-
poses” is used frequently. These terms are
closely related and already have been generally
defined. Because ideas are the substance of
statistical agencies, further comment is merited.
The basic function of a statistical agency is
to produce information useful to planners,
managers, and students. This information is
produced largely by adaptation of statistical
science methods that collect and display the
essence of a body of evidence and do not allow
distracting details to overshadow main conclu-
sions. Statistical discipline recognizes that there
is variation in nature and societies: single obser-
vations often will be unrepresentative of the
classes from which they are drawn. Accordingly,
attention is focused not on individual observa-
tions or entities but on the characteristics and
attributes of groups of observations and relation-
ships among different groups.
The statistician provides greater information
by discovering, for example, that the average
length of stay in a class of hospitals is 7.5 days
(instead of saying that Jane Doe stayed 11 days
in St. Mary’s), or that the average length of stay
is greater for cancer admissions to a hospital
than for stroke admissions (instead of noting
that Smith stayed 3 days for a cancer admission
and Jones, 8 days for a stroke admission), or
that the average of all lengths-of-stay was 6.5
days in 1974 compared with 7.3 days in 1970
(instead of finding that a particular patient was
hospitalized in 1975 for 8 days, but was
hospitalized in 1970 for only 5 days for appar-
ently the same condition), The statistical agency,
arguing from either a sampling or complete
averages, rates, ratios, - percentages, or other
mathematically expressed functional relation-
ships.
A Fundamental Principle
The statistician never needs to know the
identity of individual elements of data and
analysis. The essence of his discipline is to treat
elements as indistinguishable from one another
within classifying categories. He has no wish to
know the individual identities, and his work is
best performed when he does not know these
identities. He must convey this fact to all
interested parties.
Extensions of Statistical Purposes
The only legitimate exceptions to this funda-
mental principle are in processing. It should be
possible in the CHSS to delineate the ex-
ceptions, to write rules covering them, and to
inform respondents concerning the exceptions
so that they understand and do not disapprove.
Operational control. –Case identification is
necessary for operational control to assure that
processing does, in fact, carry out intended data
reductions. This requirement is easily met by
using a nonsense ID number that uniquely iden-
tifies the datum but does not identify a person
or establishment.
Quality control. –If the main processor uses
input data that are identified only by nonsense
ID numbers, there must be a key some place that
translates it to an identifiable entity to permit a
quality check on the input. This key or cross-
walk can be restricted to a subsample of all
cases, and can be- held by someone other than
the main processor. For example, if NCHS is the
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main processor, the key might be held by the
State partner or by a hospital supplier of data.
The Center has an important responsibility,
however, for the accuracy of statistics released
under its aegis. Therefore, NCHS must have
access to the key when it is necessary to exercise
quality control over input. This access can be
limited to selected employees under oath not to
divulge the identities. The key can remain in the
possession of the original holder and never
appear on centralized Federal records.
Duplication. –A class of operations exists for
which it is highly desirable, if not essential; that
the main processor–for example, NCHS–has
possession of individual identifiers during a
processing period. Two of the several situations
of this class are mentioned briefly. One situation
is in the manpower field, where the State agen-
cies may report to NCHS numbers and descrip-
tions of licensed persons in certain occupations.
Some individuals are licensed in more than one
State. Counts of persons are desired for the
Nation as a whole; therefore, it is necessary to
eliminate duplicates from the State reports. The
most efficient way of doing this elimination is
by matching individuals identified by a common
denominator, perhaps a Social Security number.
The duplication problem could be handled
in a different manner, and the need for a
common identifier could be avoided. The essen-
tial step would be to require that the licensing
document and subsequent transcriptions include
the item “Number of States in which licensed.”
If a particular person is licensed in three States,
then in statistical tabulations this person is
counted as “1/3 person” each time he appears.
The resulting totals will be correct unduplicated
counts. In situations in which an unduplicated
count is not the objective, the “1/3 weight” can
be appropriately adjusted.
In another situation, NCHS might sample
hospitals or physicians to get information about
patients. The study may require for each sam-
pled patient a record of his experience with
hospitals and physicians. The only feasible way
to assemble such data is to know, for a period,
the identity of the patient.
In both of these situations, as in others, the
solution is to (1) restrict access to the identifiers
to a minimum number of sworn employees
during the processing or matching interval, (2)
physically separate the key from the substantive
record as soon as it is procedurally possible, and
(3) destroy the key as soon as it is no longer
needed for processing or quality control.
Frame for sampling. –A major contribution
of modern statistical theory is the introduction
of probability sampling as a means of obtaining
higher quality information at lower costs. Thus,
for example, it is likely that better statistics will
result from careful processing of data from a
probability sampling of 500 hospitals than from
a more routine tabulation of data from a
universe of 7,000 hospitals–and at considerably
less cost. However, sampling requires at least
some measure of identification of individual
units in the universe.
In the sampling of facilities or other business
establishments, confidentiality is normally not a
real issue. The reason is that name, address,
nature of business, and “size’’-the attributes
usually needed for sampling-need not be given
protected-data status. This information can rea-
sonably be considered to be in the public
domain.
On the other hand, within a substantial class
of situations, it is improper to make a list of
establishments available as a frame for sampling.
Suppose the list contains-or has been con-
structed from—information that has been desig-
nated as “protected data”; for example, it
contains a count of abortions performed in a
particular hospital in the previous year. It is
improper to give that list to a third party, or to
use it as a frame for sampling of hospitals
conditioned on that information, or to give a
third party access to the sample. The immediate
reason for this impropriety is that to use the list
as stated is equivalent to saying: “This is a list of
hospitals where abortions are performed,” when
the confidentiality assurance prohibits such a
disclosure. The underlying reasons are that such
a release might damage the hospital and had not
been requested when the hospital first supplied
the data.
Using lists of persons as frames for sampling
has most of the characteristics of the establish-
ment problem with additional features. The key
here is to explain to the respondent, when he
first replies, the extent to which his reply may
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be used subsequently as the frame for further
sampling or followup. Subsequent use must be
within the bounds of that explanation. Any
potential return to the respondent might be
considered an unreasonable demand on his time.
Therefore, he needs to be given the opportunity
to refuse at the first inquiry.
A delicate aspect of subsequent use of
protected data, for frames or other purposes,
hinges around the phrase “. . without his con-
sent. . . .“ Suppose, in a first survey, nothing is
said about using the data for a given purpose.
Later, the collector wishes to use the data for
that purpose and considers returning to the
original respondent and asking for consent to do
so. This procedure is acceptable in most situa-
tions, although it would have been better to
have foreseen the request when the data were
first collected and to have secured consent then.
In other situations, however, it is not acceptable,
for example, if the respondent has to make a
new decision that is in itself compromising, he
should not be forced to make the decision.
A specialized instance of followup is found
in “two-phase” survey designs. In the first phase,
the initial measurement or inquiry is to classify
persons or other entities into differing cate-
gories. In the second phase, additional measure-
ment or inquiries are administered to subsamples
of entities classified in the first phase. Clearly
individual identification must be retained at
least into the second phase of operations.
The necessary and sufficient action for
handling these processing exceptions is the one
stated in the first para~aph of the section
“Extensions of Statistical Purposes” in this
chapter: at the time of collection, inform
respondents of intended procedures in such a






Almost every datum acquired is initially
associated with a specific person, facility, prod-
uct, or other entity. Usually the datum is tagged
with a unique identifier that relates it to the
specific entity. For persons, the likely identifier
is a name or an ID number, such as a Social Se-
curity Number (SSN). Sometimes the datum is
linked to the person by a nonsense number, and
the key to personal identification is stored in a
separate record. Facilities likewise may be
labeled with their names or with an ID number.
As noted in chapter VII, the need by the statisti-
cian for unit identification is not for output dis-
play but for processing purposes. The recom-
mended guiding principle for handling protected
data is to separate meaningful unit identification
from substantive data at as early a stage in proc-
essing as essential requirements permit. Thus
privacy infringements, either intentional or in-
advertent, are minimized.
Suggested Procedural Practices
A mechanical device that facilitates data
processing while offering additional protection is
the assignment of a nonsense identification
number for each name of a person or establish-
ment and arranging for a separate register or key
that matches on a one-to-one relationship. It is
possible, and sometimes desirable, to detach the
name, address, and other identifying descriptors
(along with a transcription of the ID number)
from original documents at an early stage in data
acquisition and place them in a separate deposi-
tory so that only the custodian of the deposi-
tory knows the identity of any case.
For many sets of protected data in the
CHSS–perhaps most–NCHS does not need to
possess
(ID) NUMBERS
either the name or the key. The Center
needs only the ID number and contractual
assurance that the State or other provider of
data (and possessor of the key) will provide
identification and/or matching in a limited
number of cases for purposes of editing, quality
control, or followup. For such data sets, a
considerable part of the Federal confidentiality
problem is resolved.
An extension of this principle and its im-
plied procedure is possible in several other
situations. The State statistical agency can use
it to provide protected data to other State agen-
cies, to local agencies, and to certain other
consumers, always being careful to delete from
the microrecord items that might identify the
individual entity.
A record that contains numerous descriptors
could lead to identification of the individual,
even if direct identification is removed, with
sufficient desire and detective work. Although
this occurrence is possible, it is doubtful that the
CHSS needs to protect itself against the combi-
nation of malicious intent and scale of effort
that would be required.
Social Security Numbers
One of the more controversial issues in
privacy debates is the extent to which the SSN
should appear on records and be used as an
identifier. Thousands of words have been writ-
ten pro and con on the matter. Several points
stand out:
1. The SSN was not originally intended as
general identification as indicated on
cards issued to individuals.
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2. The Social Security Administration has
discouraged the use of the SSN as a
general identifier.
3. The Federal Government has used the
SSN for a wide range of identification
purposes and, indeed, since 1943 has
required its agencies to use the SSN as an
identifier in any new system of person-
nel records.
4. ‘ The Privacy Act of 1974, however, states,
in effect, that the SSN shall not be
required by any Federal, State, or local
agency under any record system in
which it was not compulsory prior to
January 1, 1975, unless it is mandated
by specific Federal statute.
5. In fact, the SSN is widely used as a
personal identifier in the U.S. Civil Serv-
ice Commission, the military, all levels of
taxing agencies, automobile and drivers’
licenses, banks, insurance companies,
credit card companies, private payrolls,
schools, immigration authorities, and
welfare agencies.
6. Despite the Privacy Act, an increasing
number of students of privacy matters
believe that the SSN is nearly a universal




DATABANKS AND FILE LINKING
Introduction
Much of the public concern about confi-
dentiality hinges on potential harmful conse-
quences that might stem from the linking of
data sets through common ID numbers or names
and the building of personal dossiers in giant
databanks. For example, Arthur R. Miller, pro-
fessor at the Harvard Law School and a serious
student of privacy matters, confessed that he,
much like others, had “voiced the fear that the
computer, with its insatiable appetite for infor-
mation, its image of infallibility, its inability to
forget anything that has been put into it, may
become the heart of a surveillance system that
will turn society into a transparent world in
which our home, our finances, and our associ-
ations are bared to the most casual observer:”z
Many similar statements have appeared in news-
papers, magazines, and books.
It is much easier to talk about such data-
banks than to construct them. However, if
constructed, databanks could serve dangerous
purposes as well as beneficial functions. Further-
more, many people advocate the building of
integrated health records for individual persons,
storing these records in databanks, and making
access to the record relatively easy.
Most commonly the entities in databanks are
thought to be persons o? business establish-
ments. However, banks in which the smallest
entity or unit is a collective, such as a county or





emotionally charged topic has
useful communication is likely
to occur only when discussion can be focused on
a few areas with recognizable boundaries. Con-
sider first these definitions.
Suppose a file consists of records of individ-
ual units, persons, business establishments, or
other entities. The record for each entity con-
tains unit-identifying characteristics 11, 12,. . .
(such as name or ID number) and attributes Al,
A2, A3, . . . (such as date of birth, marital
status, or income). A second file contains unit
records with the same identifying characteristics
11,12, . . . and another set of characteristics B] ,
B2, B3, . . . (perhaps State of residence, make of
automobile owned, and number of times
arrested in the last 3 years). The process of
matching these two files in identifying charac-
teristics and creating a new unit that contains
the information, Al , A2, A3, . . ., B1 , B2, B3,
. . . is called “file linking.” The new record may
or may not include the common unit-identifiers
11, 12, . . . . (It may also be possible to merge
the two files without using the common identi-
fiers, but that possibility is excluded from
discussion.) Either of the files might contain
many entities, just a few, or even a single entity,
but only files that contain a substantial number
of entities are of interest.
Clearly, it is theoretically possible to link
three or more files to form the new record. If
three or more files are linked and if the unit
identifiers are retained in the new record, then
the collection of new records is called a “data-
bank.”
In the discussion that follows, attention will
be restricted to instances where the linking is of
unit records of persons or facilities, although, as
noted, the process can be applied to units that
are small collectives, such as a county, an
industry, or an occupation.
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Some Databank Cousins
Many record keeping activities have features
similar to those just described, but should not be
considered to be databanks-perhaps they could
be called “databank cousins.” The CHSS is not
much concerned here with databank cousins,
but for background purposes a few might be
noted.
Ordinary double entry bookkeeping involves
the posting of similar items to a common ac-
count; however, it is not intended that differ-
ing kinds of information about a person or facil-
ity be merged. The more extensive charge sys-
tems such as American Express or VISA are
single files and not databanks. The same can be
said for the university’s file of student grades,
the airline’s reservation system, or the business
office’s records of a hospital. Merging any two
of these separate files creates linked files. Merg-
ing payroll records, student records, and hospital
records into a file that retained person identifi-
cation constitutes a databank.
Technological Feasibility
It was always theoretically possible to com-
pile dossiers on persons or facilities by manual
techniques. Where policy, will, time, personnel,
and financial resources are present, it is possible
manually to merge birth, death, employment,
health, military, church, financial, tax, and other
records for individual persons. To some degree
this merging has been done by most societies,
and to a high degree by a few. However, it is
difficult and expensive. Increased use of com-
mon identification numbers, such as birth or
SSN’S, and the capabilities of the computer have
made linking of files and construction of data-
banks less difficult and less costly. However, this
process is still neither easy nor inexpensive.
Even with the computer, constructing a
databank presents many difficulties. After study-
ing numerous record systems, Alan Westin and
Michael Baker identified four major hurdles in
databank building:3
1. Requirements for proposed databanks
usually demand massive changes in com-




and these changes meet with resistance
from the managers of the components.
Conceptual problems in determining
what items are truly useful and signifi-
cant result in failure to establish agreed-
upon data sets that are properly main-
tained, or that can be utilized for any
significant purpose.
Software for appropriate edit, input, and
retrieval of stored data in unforeseen
format demands is rare, if existent at all.
People can browse through or muddle
along with imprecise records—but the
computer, which must be instructed in
great detail for every contingency, can-
not.
Costs of problem solution and even
routine op&ations are great, and top
managers are most reluctant to allocate
scarce resources to a low-yield databank.
Prevalence of Databanks
The construction and maintenance of large
databanks are certainly technologically possible.
However, except for a few special-purpose data-
banks, notably in the fields of credit, insurance,
and law enforcement, the databank in the
United States is a possibility, not a reality. In
1972, Westin and Baker found not a single
general-purpose databank, either local or na-
tional, in the country.3
In the medical and health fields there are
proponents of and experimenters with databank-
ing information pertinent to individuals. Their
long-range goal is to accelerate diagnosis and
treatment by enabling physicians to retrieve a
patient’s medical history from a remotely lo-
cated central databank. Physicians may also be
able to tap stored statistical data to assign
“probabilities” to specified courses of treat-
ment. Such databanks are future goals, not
present realities. A few less ambitious embryonic
local medical systems are operating, for exam-
ple, the multi-state information system, which
links psychiatric hospitals, clinics, and outpa-
tient centers in the New England area.
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Linking Other Than for Databanks
Other demands for files do not create
databanks. In various Federal Government
operations, two data files can be linked for
statistical purposes only. For illustration, busi-
ness data from the Social Security Administra-
tion, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and
the Census Bureau are linked to produce de-
tailed economic information in industrial and
commercial fields. The linked data are released
only in aggregated form and are never used for
governmental action regarding an establishment.
Another illustration is the use of one agen-
cy’s data by another. The Form 1040 Personal
Income Tax information for consecutive years is
linked through SSN’S to show an individual’s
migration and then fed into Census Bureau
procedures to estimate local population mobil-
ity. The local population data then become
input for calculation of revenue sharing. Again,
such uses are strictly statistical and not for
action concerning an individual. The IRS may
exercise enforcement action regarding individ-
uals, but this action has nothing to do with this
linking operation. This situation illustrates an
administrative record as the source of both a
protected data set and a case-action datum.
In the 1970 Decennial Census, a complex
evaluation project involved the linking of census
data with birth registrations. The project was
conducted by the Census Bureau, using NCHS
birth records (with the permission of State
agencies). The ultimate objective was to estimate
the lack of coverage in the 1970 Census by
comparing those counts with aged birth cohorts
from earlier years. However, it was necessary to
discover the extent of underreporting of births
through a reverse record check on a sample of
persons to determine if birth certificates existed
for them.
In some situations, (see chapter VII), two
files may be linked to forma comprehensive but
unduplicated frame or directory of a universe of
facilities. Such situations occur if a mailing of
notices to all firms in the universe is requested,
or if one wishes to draw a probability sample
from a high-quality frame.
Researchers and program planners make
persistent demands for linked files for multi-
variate analysis. The objective is to identify
variables that explain or predict a dependent
phenomenon of prime interest. With a single file,
the analysis may be able to relate, for example,
only the dependent and two independent vari-
ables. By linking two files, the analysis may be
expanded by considering three additional signifi-
cant predictors. The logic of this argument is
persuasive. Yet aside from questions of confi-
dentiality, three considerations that lessen the





Only in a few examples of this tech-
nique, important results that could not
have been obtained by other methods
were secured from linked microfilms.
A method that deserves more intensive
study is substituting small collectives of
persons for individuals as the units of
analysis in multivariate equations.
Often the attempt to integrate two
bodies of data into clean individual
records faces substantial operational dif-
ficulties. Such hurdles are different clas-
sification systems in the two files, dif-
ferent coverages , incomplete individual
records, different time references, differ-
ent substantive definitions, different




Many people fear linking of two files of
identifiable microdat a. Even when the linking
is for statistical purposes only, it does increase
the risk of undesirable disclosure or exposure to
invasion of privacy—albeit, nearly always to a
trivial degree. Earlier sections of this chapter
discuss significant features of the linking prob-
lem. The linking of microdata files is some-
times useful, but it is usually difficult and
expensive and often neither necessary nor very
productive. Recommendations are as follows:
1. Use the linking of micro data files infre-
quently because it is potentially danger-
ous to confidentiality and use it only
when the intended product is both
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highly valuable and unattainable by
other means at a tolerable cost.
2. Employ available techniques to camou-
flage the identity of the linked micro-
data, and make certain that the ensuing
risk of harm to individuals or facilities is
inconsequential.
3. Inform the respondent at the time of
original collection of a data set that a
linking operation is intended.
4. Never use protected data in a linking











experience. However, specific and clearly under-
The concept of the CHSS encompasses
collection, processing, analysis, and use of data
and implies corresponding interacting relation-
ships among the collectors, analysts, and the
ultimate users. This report cannot declare what
the organizational structure of this system
should be. A broad spectrum of political and
economic considerations will be the major deter-
minants of that structure. Legislation is not the
least of these considerations, and certain legisla-
tive concepts will be discussed in the next
chapter. This chapter discusses the impact of
matters of privacy and confidentiality on organi-
zations and the influence of organizational
structure on both policy and procedures in data
handling.
Entities that are or may be participants in
the system are NCHS and other Federal agen-
cies, State Centers for Health Statistics and
other State departments, municipal bodies, Pro-
fessional Standards Review Organizations
(PSRO’S), Regional Medical Pro~ams (RMP’s),
the Planning Organizations under Public Law
93-641, AMA, AHA, other professional associa-
tions, Professional Activities Study (PAS), other
central processors, and subcontractors. Essential
elements, too, are the health services providers
and recipients, which are the sources of the
data: hospitals, institutions, physicians, nurses,
patients, registrars, laboratories, and households.
Legislators, budget authorities, schools, stu-
dents, and the general public for whom the
entire enterprise is undertaken also participate in
the system.
A viable system should be flexible to adapt
to changing situations and to take advantage of
st;od relationships r~garding confidentiality
should be established among all the participants
in the system. The target should be clear, and
there should be a common understanding of
what information will be made available by
which providers and to which collectors; what
degree of confidential handling of data will be
exercised by those collectors; and, in particular,
for whom further access to the data will be
authorized and for what purposes.
Thus, guidelines and rules governing confi-
dentiality throughout the system are needed.
The organizational structure should be con-
structed so that the rules are known to all af-
fected parties and can be enforced, No single
agency or component of the system is autono-
mous–cooperative development is the main-
spring of successful operation. However, every
complex activity needs a coordinator, and on
issues of confidentiality in the CHSS, NCHS
should accept the responsibility of coordinator.
Federal Agency Relationships
Confidentiality relationships among Federal
agencies, and particularly between NCHS and
other Federal agencies, are largely fixed by law
(see chapter XI). Although certain modifications
of existing law may be desirable, confidentiality
risks to which NCHS and the CHSS may be
subject are minimal within the Federal establish-
ment. Data acquired by NCHS under assurances
of a classification equivalent to protected data
have immunity from use in individually identifi-
able form by any agency (including all Federal
Government agencies) outside NCHS, without
the consent of the provider. Contrastingly, any
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data acquired by NCHS but not given protected
data shielding can be potentially in the public
domain and available to all, including any
Federal agency.
As an integral part of its role as architect and
handler of protected data, the Center should
ensure that other units of the Public Health
Service and the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare (DHEW) stand in the same
relationship to NCHS regarding dissemination of
data as does any other component of the
Federal Government. Legislation may be intro-
duced to give special status to a designated set of
Federal general-purpose statistical agencies
among whom protected data may be shared. A
somewhat controversial issue is whether NCHS
might be required to permit use of identifiable
protected data for statistical purposes only by
other units of DHEW under provisions of the
Privacy Act of 1974 or even by Federal agencies
outside DHEW under provisions of the Reports
Act of 1942. The Center has opposed success-
fully such interpretations up to the present,
Even if this use were permitted, the data could
certainly not be used “in whole or in part in




NCHS formal agreements regarding confi-
dentiality outside Federal Government agencies
should be restricted to two categories. One
category is a single designated agency within
each State. According to Section 306(e) of
Public Law 95-623 “States participating in the
System shall designate a State agency to admin-
ister or be responsible for the administration of
the statistical activities within the State under
the System.” Preferably this agency wiIl be a
State Center for Statistics or a State Center for
Health Statistics, but it could be any governme-
ntalunit chosen by the Governor.
To maximize understanding and minimize
State-Federal confusion, the basic guidelines,
authorities, and contracts involving health
bodies within the State and regarding health
statistics should be between those bodies and
the State Center or between the State Center
and NCHS. Special agreement might grant lati-
tude for division of a State into two parts-for
example, New York City and upstate New York
or Chicago and downstate Illinois-if the State
chose to do so.
For metropolitan areas that cross State lines,
one State could serve as the official contact for
NCHS, with local arrangements being coordi-
nated in both States by one designated State
Center.
The second category with which NCHS
might have formal arrangements is original sup-
pliers of data. These arrangements would be
made with the knowledge of, and at times
through, the State Centers. However, in some
situations NCHS must proceed independently of
State Centers and inform them of arrangements
that have been made. Such situations are the
Health Interview SurVey, the Health Exami-
nation Survey, the Survey of Ambulatory Care,
other national surveys that are not operationally
a part of the CHSS, and agreements reached
with certain agencies such as SSA, PAS, AHA, or
the Census Bureau. A particular subclass of this
type is State or local agreements in other
programs in States that have not established a
State Center.
Central Processors
Much can be said for the establishment of a
State Center for Health Statistics or even a State
Statistical Center, as a central depository and as
an initial data collector, central processor, and
distributor of data to Federal, State, municipal,
PSRO, planning agencies, and other consumers.
This idea is not fully developed here; but de-
tailed development of the concept of the imme-
diate question of central processing and the
overall network treated in chapter IX is needed.
The Statistics Center should be a permanent
State agency, or a State corporation chartered
specifically for this purpose. It cannot be either
an ordinary private establishment or some ad
hoc component of a temporary community
coalition.
Metropolitan areas that cross State lines may
be handled by formal State compacts.
The statistics center should be established by
statute, and the nature of operation should be
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watched carefully, Enabling legislation such as be a governmentally chartered organization is
Statistics Canada (with much modification) gives that NCHS and the CHSS cannot avoid responsi-
a starting point for new enactment. bility for the integrity of the system, and yet
The reason for this latter recommendation cannot exercise effective control without line
and the reason that the central processor should authority based on law.
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CHAPTER Xl
LEGISLATION, REGULATIONS, AND RULES
Legislative Control and Protection
The privacy-confidentiality-freedom of in-
formation complex generates conflicts and an-
tagonisms, In a society governed by law, it is
essential that a legal framework be built to guide
decisions made in the confidentiality realm. For
the CHSS the framework is based on both
Federal and State law and derivative regulations,
orders, and instructions; adequate coding and
indexing of these legal materials are required.
This need has been widely recognized and
has resulted in a flood of statutes, regulations,
rules, and court cases. More. than a dozen
Federal statutes, tens of thousands of words in
Federal regulations , voluminous Federal rules
and procedural statements, and uncounted State
provisions have important bearing on the CHSS.
More than 200 bills on privacy and confidenti-
ality were introduced in the 93rd Congress, and
many were reintroduced in later Congresses.
Codification or even a digest of these pro-
nouncements is beyond the scope of the present
project. Here, attention is directed to some of
the most significant Federal legislation in the
area, a few of the emerging legislative principles,
and the need for further action.
The NCHS Statutory Keystone
The keystone of NCHS policy and practice
in the protection of confidential data has been
restated in the revised enabling act for the
Center. The Public Health Service Act (42
KJ.S.C. 242m) provides in section 308(d) (sec-
tions 304 and 306 refer to authorization for
basic NCHS activities):
“No information obtained in the course of
activities undertaken or supported under
section 304, 305, 306, 307, or 309, may be
used for any purpose other than the purpose
for which it was supplied unless authorized
by guidelines in effect under section
306( 1)(2) or under regulations of the Secre-
tary; and (1) in the case of information
obtained in the course of health statistical or
epidemiological activities under section 304
or 306, such information may not be pub-
lished or released in other form if the
particular establishment or person supplying
the information or described in it is identifi-
able unless such establishment or person has
consented (as determined under regulations
of the Secretary) to its publication or release
in other form, . . .“
This statement is the current revision of the
former NCHS confidentiality section 305(a) of
the Public Health Service Act.
All NCHS procedural controls are consistent
with this statute; equivalent Center policy ante-
dates the passage of law. The clause beginning
“(l) in the case of information” puts the sharp-
est teeth into the law—it limits the Secretary’s
discretion (as well as that of the Center) to
defining “consent .“ This law, too, is the basis
for the following explanation in DHEW regula-
tions, which exempt NCHS data from many of
the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974
that could be troublesome to the CHSS:
6<
. . . Section 308(d) of that Act requires these
systems of records to be maintained and
used solely as statistical records. . . . The
information contained in these records is not
used in whole or in part in making any
determination about an identifiable individ-
ual, and as required by section 308(d) it is
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not published or released in a form which
would identify the individual who supplies it
or the individual who [sic] it is about. . . .
Currently, much of the information con-
tained in these records is obtained through
the voluntary cooperation of States, local-
ities, hospitals, physicians, family planning
agencies, and other organizations with the
understanding that the National Center for
Health Statistics will not disclose to anyone
the personally identifiable information sup-
plied by these sources.”
The Privacy Act of 1974
As a result of debate over a wide range of
related issues, the 93rd Congress passed a com-
promise omnibus bill, sponsored by Senator
Ervin and Congressmen Moorhead, entitled the
Privacy Act of 1974. This legislation is very
complex and, in its text and accompanying
explanation from the cognizant congressional
committees, includes more than 9,000 words. Its
precise and full meaning may not be known for
several years, until supporting regulations, inter-
pretations, and perhaps court decisions clarify
ambiguous and partially conflicting provisions
and objectives. Paired with the Freedom of
Information Act, as amended in 1974, the
Privacy Act is the most comprehensive general
Federal statute on confidentiality y. The following
are especially notable:
1. The title of the Act and its introductory
sections declare that protection of pri-
vacy is the primary objective and that
the right to privacy is a personal and
fundamental right protected by the Con-
stitution of the United States. A further
statement is that it is necessary and
proper for Congress to regulate the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissem-
inateion of information by Federal
agencies.
2. The Act also declares, however, that the
“use of sophisticated information tech-
nology . . . is essential to efficient opera-
tion of the government” and that regula-
tions should permit exemptions from the




Act in cases “in which there is an
important public policy need for such
exemption as determined by specific
statutory authority .“ (This provision
produced the DHEW regulation quoted
in the previous section.)
The Act notes the requirements of the
Freedom of Information Law and does
not seek to repeal any of its provisions,
Therefore, the text of the Act and its
interpretations are new landmarks in the
search for balance between protection of
privacy and confidentiality and the pub-
lic’s right and need to know.
In considerable measure the Privacy Act
provides that an individual can deter-
mine what records pertaining to him are
collected, maintained, used, or dissemi-
nated by Federal agencies, and can pre-
vent those records, collected for a partic-
ular purpose, from being used or made
avaiIable for another purpose without his
consent.
The exceptions are far reaching and (sub-
ject to interpretation) may open wide
quite a few ‘doors. Some exceptions to
protective control (agencies are required
to formulate regulations on these mat-
ters, and the Office of Management and








Investigative material compiled for
law enforcement (with some counter
exceptions).
Investigative material relating to suit-
ability for employment and related
tests.
Certain archival records.
Data transferred to a person pursu-
ant to disclosure of compelling cir-
cumstances affecting the health or
safety of an individual.
Data in “routine use” defined as
“the use of a record for a purpose
compatible with the purpose for
which it was collected.”
Data given to a congressional com-









Data needed for the Com~troller
General of the United States. ‘
Data to “a recipient who has pro-
vided advance written assurance that
the record will be used solely as a
statistical research or reporting re-
cord, and the record is to be transfm-
red in a form that is not individually
identifiable. ” (Substantial ambiguity
of intent results from the way this
provision is phrased.)
Data pursuant to subpoena by the
courts.
Material controlled by another law,
such as the NCHS law quoted in the
section, “The NCHS Statutory Key-
stone.” The reason for this exemp-
tion is that the Act does not intend
to repeal other laws.
Regarding penalties for infractions of the
Privacy Act imposed upon agencies con-
tracting with a Federal agency, the con-
tractor and employees of the contractor
shall be considered to be employees of
the Federal agency and thereby subject
to being declared guilty of a misde-
meanor and fined up to $5,000.
The Privacy Protection Study Commis-
sion was established with broad powers
of investigation and study and a charge
to make further recommendations
within 2 years. The President appointed
three members of the Commission; the
House and Senate appointed two mem-
bers each. The Commission published its
report, entitled Personal Privacy in an
Information Society, in July 1977.
The Freedom of Information Act
The counterpoint to the Privacy Act is the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) as
amended in 1974 and 1976. The public is
properly concerned not only with unwarranted
invasion of privacy and improper use of privi-
leged data but also with refusal by governments
to reveal information that should be in the pub-
lic domain. The CHSS must be concerned with
both of these hazards.
Congress has tried to deal with the second of
the two risks through the FOIA. This law
declares that—with important exceptions—
records possessed by the Federal Government
must be made available to any person, upon
demand, at cost. Among the exceptions impor-
tant to the CHSS are: (1) data specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute (e.g.,
NCHS 308(d))b ; (2) personnel, medical and
similar files, the disclosure of which would
constitute a clear, unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy; and (3) certain classes of
privileged or confidential data. The FOIA im-
poses no unmanageable restraints on the CHSS,
and on the contrary, is an incentive to promote
wide dissemination of data in all situations in
which confidentiality is unnecessary and has not
been assured.
The Federal Reports Act
The Federal Statistical System is coordi-
nated by OMB in the Executive Office of the
President,’ under the provisions of the Federal
Reports Act of 1942 (44 U.S.C. 3501) and the
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C.
18b). These two Acts give authority to OMB
that includes legislative review functions, allo-
cation of budgets, and the right to withhold
approval of any reporting plan. Concern has
been expressed over certain sections of the
Reports Act that may give the OMB Director
authority to require any Federal agency to give
to any other Federal agency information ob-
tained from any person.
However, careful reading of the Act reveals
restricting provisions that, in conjunction with
NCHS section 308(d), leave the CHSS immune
from the Reports Act regarding improper access
bThe Govement ~ the sunshine Act of 1976
amended this provision by adding: “(other than section
552 b of this title), provided that such statute (A) re-
quires that the matters be withheld from the public in
such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or
(B) establishes particular criteria for withhoMing or
refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.”
cAdministered in part since 1978 by the Secretary
of Commerce.
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to confidential data. Relevant Reports Act
provisions are:
“Information obtained by a Federal agency
from any person or persons may, pursuant
to this Act, be released to any other Federal
agency only if (1) the information shall be
released in the form of statistical totals or
summaries; or (2) the information as sup-
plied by persons to a Federal agency shall
not, at the time of collection, have been
declared by that agency or any superior
authority to be confidential; or (3) the
persons supplying the information shall con-
sent to the release of it to a second agency
by the agency to which the information was
originally supplied; or (4) the Federal agency
to which another Federal agency shall re-
lease the information has authority to col-
lect the information itself and such author-
ity is supported by legal provision for
criminal penalties against persons failing to
supply such information .“
Furthermore, if any information is transferred
from one agency to another, the data-protecting
legal restraints and penalties of both agencies for
improper use apply with full force to the
officers and employees of the receiving agency.
The Paperwork Commission
Another act passed by Congress on Decem-
ber 27, 1974, created the Commission on
Federal Paperwork. The charter for this Com-
mission is to “study and investigate statutes,
policies, rules, regulations, procedures and prac-
tices of the Federal Government relating to
information gathering, processing, and dissemi-
nation, and the management and control of
these information activities.”” The Commission
was instructed to give a final report to Congress
within 2 years of its first meeting (which was
held in early Ott. 1975). Clearly, the charter was
broad enough to permit recommendations that
might affect the CHSS in many ways, including
the issues of privacy, confidentiality, and trans-
fer of data.d
dThe Commission’s report was published on Oct. 3,
1977.
Emerging Principles
Various well-supported propositions likely









Persons have a fundamental right to
privacy, and this right should not be
infringed upon beyond the truly neces-
sary requirements of society.
Providers of data to governmental agen-
cies are entitled to know under what
authority the data are being collected
and for what purposes.
An individual must be able to prevent
the use of personal information that was
obtained for one purpose from being
used for other purposes without his
consent. (See chapter VII and the sec-
tion “Statistical Purposes” in chapter
XVII for a discussion of “purposes” relat-
ing to statistical purposes, See also the
section “Informed Consent” in chapter
IV for comments on “consent.”)
Transfer of personally identifiable data
from one custodian to another should
occur only in accordance with carefully
formulated and widely understood writ-
ten rules.
Democratic societies and their govern-
ments agree that a wide range of data
should be collected and analyzed so that
planning and execution of social pro-
grams can be performed on a rational
basis. (This principle is embodied in the
Social Security Act, in health planning
legislation, in licensing requirements, and
in many other statistics.)
A basic difference exists between infor-
mation collected and used only as statis-
tical evidence (what this report has
termed “protected data”) and personally
identifiable data used directly to affect
the rights, benefits, privileges, responsi-
bilities, duties, or proscriptions of indi-
viduals.
Freedom of access by all to data that are
not privileged or confidential should be
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inherent. Governments should not cate-
gorize data as privileged unless the classi-
fication is necessary to secure accurate
reporting or to prevent individuals
from being unjustifiably subject to harm,
8. Certain classes of privileged data should 6.
be immune from subpoena by the courts
or legislative bodies.
Unresolved Legal Issues
Adequate legislation is an evolving condi-
tion. Of special concern to the CHSS are legal






A clear distinction between “statistical
purposes” and “administrative pur-
poses.”
Rules that secure an acceptable balance
between the statistician’s need for access 7.
to data that the holders consider confi-
dential and his legal protection from
forced release of data that he has granted
privileged status.
Guidelines for resolving situations where
Federal and State law may conflict.
Determination of what operationally
constitutes “informed consent.”
rules, circulars, procedures, and allied
documents must be compiled, coordi-
nated, and indexed into a single printed
document, and made available on a
broad scale. This activity is urgent.
Regarding State law, it is unlikely that
the same procedures can be accom-
plished. However, steps should be taken
to develop guidelines, and examples
should be assembled, Summaries also
should be attempted as resources permit,
A contract to do this for several States
was a step in the right direction. Begin-
ning with “zero draft” and progressing
through many revisions, NCHS should
write the model State laws, regulations,
and procedures. In fact, section 306(d)
of Public Law 93-353 required that this
be done .e
Financial auditing procedures are an
essential safeguard against malfeasance in
governmental and other offices. In what
manner and to what degree should audit-
ing be allowed to infringe on privacy and
confidentiality ? This question is only
one facet of the more general issues of
legislative oversight of the executive
branches.
Coding and abstracting Federal law. All





Governments plan to secure needed informa-
tion and to protect the affected respondents and
subjects. The CHSS must recognize, however,
that plans and intentions may not be fully
realized, and consequently must try to incorpo-
rate safeguards that will minimize unwanted
occurrences. This subject is not treated in detail,
but several types of safeguards for which provi-




Legislation, regulations, and rules of
operation should provide sanctions and
penalties for employees, officers, and
other parties who fail to comply with
guidelines.
Physical security of records should be
provided, both to assure actual protec-
tion and to create a climate of recog-
nized importance. Malicious violation of
security in the CHSS is a.minor problem,
but the public should be informed that
such violation is carefully monitored,
For each type of data, formal rules
should be established and followed to
prevent inadvertent disclosure from tab-
4.
5.
ulated data, with special attention to
“small cells” and unusual combinations.
An individual possibly maybe identified
from a record if the record contains
multiple descriptors even if it does not
show a name or an ID number. Editors
must be alert to avoid such releases.
Another sequence that may violate
security of a file—either inadvertently or
intentionally—even when the primary
file contains no directly identifiable
name or number and only a small num-
ber of descriptors is what might be
termed the “serial linking potential.”
Suppose Primary File I contains attri-
butes A and C and a nonsense case code
1. File II contains attributes C and D and
cases codes 1 and 2. File 111contains at-
tributes E, F, G, and H and case code 2.
Although Files I and III are not tied at
all, it is still possible to establish the full
record: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H and
possibly the identity of the person, No
universal solution exists for this prob-
lem. Fortunately, the CHSS should not
be faced with it often. Recognition of
the possibility of serial linking should





Traditionally, release of statistical data has
been intheform ofpublished tables. Transferor
data in unit form has occurred most often by
paper on microfilm copy or punchcard. Concep-
tually, these transcription devices make possible
every computer activity. However, potential of
rapid computer transcription and association of
data items are viewed as hazardous to the pro-
tection of personal information. The computer
does make the transfer of data and the merging
of different items of information about a given
person or facility easier. The computer also has
broadened the way for a flexible use of micro-
data that may actually reduce the risk of misuse
of data for individuals-the concept is one of
public-use tapes,
The public-use tape is a magnetic tape of
individual records, with direct personal identifi-
cation and other potentially identifying items
removed so that the tape can be made publicly
available. This device permits researchers or
other investigators to manipulate and analyze
microdata in useful ways without access to the
identification of individuals. The public-use tape
thus allows nearly all of the research benefits
that access to identifiable records would pro-
vide, with less overall cost, and significantly
reduces the demand for identifiable data.
The Center has published a report6 that
describes available NCHS public-use tapes and
identifies the measures taken to protect confi-
dentiality. Participating units of the CHSS
should expand the public-use tape program,
while preserving confidentiality by developing
appropriate rules for necessary item suppression





Many of the problems and issues in the
privacy, confidentiality, and freedom of infor-
mation complex are difficult. For some, no
direct solution that has wide acceptance can be
found. Perhaps for others, no direct solution is
necessary. Identified here are a few bypassing or
avoidance techniques that make it possible to
reach informational objectives without yielding
access to microdata that identify individual
persons or establishments. Some of these meth-
odologies have special relevance to those confi-
dentiality problems that are present in linked
microdata.
Aggregated data.–The simplest avoidance
techniques are restriction of access to microdata
to the collectors and processors and publication
or release of data only in aggregated format.
Although these techniques are clearly not the
answer to all problems, they may be the answer
to many more than is apparent. In program
planning, execution, or evaluation, aggregated
data may be fully adequate or even economi-
cally more efficient than microdata.
Microaggregation. –This relatively new de-
vice seeks to retain a considerable part of the
advantage of micro data, while utilizing only
aggregated quantities. Many variations exist. An
illustrative one sorts persons into small units of,
for example, five people; then calculates an
average value for each of the statistics of interest
for each unit. These average-valued small units
become the units of analysis. In a refinement or
variant of this process, a distinct new value is
assigned to each of the five persons in a small
unit. The new value is the average of the five
plus a random normal deviate (the size of the
normal deviate was calculated from several
similar groups of five persons).
Random contamination. –A different, but
somewhat similar technique adds the random
normal deviate to the observed value for each
person. This process also preserves the overall
totals and means, but camouflages the data for
an individual person. It tends to preserve the
distribution of cases that would result from
using original data.
Random substitution. –In this variation, a
first random number is selected to decide
whether to leave an original microdatum un-
touched” or to modify it; if it is to be modified,
another random number is chosen to be the
selector of a substitute measure for the observed
measure—the substitute measure being one pos-
sessed by another person in the survey,
Range measurement. –For many purposes,
an exact measure of a characteristic is unneces-
sary (an exact measure may be nearly impossible
anyway). If the statistic is income, then instead
of asking for annual income initially, the ques-
tion is put in terms of “intervals” or “ranges,”
so that, perhaps, the income is primarily re-
corded as “between $5,000 and $10,000.” The
respondent may consider such information as
nonsensitive, and, thus, the confidentiality issue
is avoided.
Randomized inquiry. –This technique, called
by some the random response procedure, has
many possible variations. Its essential feature is
that the original collector never knows how the
respondent replied to a particular question, or
even if he did. Yet summary measures are
obtained, with calculable precision.
Synthetic estimates. –This general methodol-
ogy also has many possible variations. The
central characteristic is the use of an algorithm
to calculate an “expected value” for a unit or
class of units, by utilizing a weighted average of
rates obtained from a larger conglomerate, with
36
the weights established by known, nonsensitive
characteristics of the units or small class of
units. Some students prefer to think of this as a
special case of substituting the value obtained
from a fitted regression equation for an observed
datum.
Responsible constrain t.–Possibly the best
rule of all is the adoption of a policy of
responsible constraint. This method advocates
that one not collect an item at all, unless the
need is clear-cut and the value of the informa-
tion outweighs the risk of privacy infringement.
(What a person does not know he cannot reveal.)
In a similar vein, it may be better not to link
two microfilms, to display tabulations of mar-
ginal value with possible unintentional disclo-
sures, or to employ unnecessarily refined classifi-
cations of persons or facilities.
Conclusion
If the objective is a census count of hospitals
or physicians by county, the avoidance tech-
niques are not relevant. However, a large part of
the CHSS output is expressed as means, aver-
ages, ratios, rates, correlations, and other statisti-
cal measures. Ingenuity in formulating avoidance
techniques can produce unbiased estimates of
such measures with adequate camouflage of
identifiable persons. This approach may be a
mq”or pathway toward resolution of problems
that are otherwise unsolvable in a climate that is
increasingly sensitive to confidentialityy issues.
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CHAPTERXV
CUSTOMIZED VARIATIONS OF PROCEDURE
Need for Flexibility
“System” implies a structured, integrated,
standardized operation that is under control.
The CHSS is a system, and should govern itself
accordingly. This fact does not mean, however,
that every component of the CHSS should be
conducted in identical fashion. Some compo-
nents of the CHSS are, in effect, intended as
efficient mechanisms for assembling, processing,
and redistributing information that is largely a
byproduct of certain administrative functions
and is in the public domain. Other units, giving
assurances of confidential handling, collect data
whose only function is statistical. Still other
units are engaged in activities that are a mixture
of these other, two. (See “Definitions and
Labels” in chapter VI.) The policies and pro-
cedures most appropriate to the differing situa-
tions also vary. The present chapter offers exam-
ples of how the CHSS, operating under a
basically uniform set of standards, can still tailor
its treatment of particular components to special
circumstances.
The self-standing direct collection sample
survey. —This survey refers to the classical statis-
tical sample survey in the tradition of the Census
Bureau Current Population Survey, or the NCHS
Health Interview Survey, in which the intent is
to produce new data or newly organized infor-
mation in aggregated format, with no release or
disclosure of personally identifiable microdata;
thus the full force of protected data applies in
strictest interpretation. The survey may be
continuing, intermittent, or one time. Respond-
ent sources might be direct measurement, inter-
view, mailed questionnaires, or transcribed rec-
ords and may be obtained from persons,
households, facilities, or other providers. The
collector is a single agent, such as NCHS or a
State Center, and assures the provider that
responses will be released in anonymous form
only, will not be released in identifiable micro-
form outside the collecting agency, and will be
used only for the purposes that have been
described to the respondent.
If the collector is NCHS, individually identi-
fiable data will be disclosed neither to other
Federal agencies nor to any other component of
the CHSS. Similarly, if a State Center is the
collector, individually identifiable data will not
be disclosed to NCHS.
Presumably, the respondent will have been
told at least one specific purpose for which the
data are being collected and that the intended
use is for statistical purposes only. Furthermore,
the respondent must be given a reasonable
understanding of what is encompassed by the
expression “statistical purposes.” Thus a sum-
mary of the interpretation explained in chapters
VI and VII of this report is in order. In
particular, if the survey microdata may be the
avenue for a subsequent contact with the re-
spondent, he should be so informed. If the
survey data are to be linked with other micro-
data, this fact should also be made clear. The
degree to which confidentiality assurances can
be enforced should also be made known to the
respondent. Usually respondent identification
should be removed from substantive data at the
earliest feasible processing stage to minimize
exposure to risk.
The cooperative protected-data sample sur-
vey. —A second class of CHSS components might
include several variations. All encompass most of
the features previously, but have one very
important distinguishing attribute that, in turn,








three parties would have access to the micro-
data, rather than the single collector. The first
party is the original collector–perhaps NCHS or
a State Center—the second party is NCHS if the
State Center is the collector, or the State Center
if NCHS is the collector. The third party is a
convenient label for any other specified person
or agency to whom access may be granted for
particular stated purposes.
The Hospital Discharge Survey (HDS) can
serve as an example of the third party, but the
following discussion is not meant necessarily to
recommend a collection design for that particu-
lar survey. If a master HDS sample is designed in
such a way that State strata or subuniverses are
defined, then some State agencies will collect
data from hospitals in their States and make the
micro data available to NCHS. For other States,
NCHS would be the collector and make micro-
data available to the States. In either case, all or
parts of the microdata maybe made available to
a third party—perhaps a Public Health Service
(PHS) planning agency–for comparing utiliza-
tion in several inner cities.
The first two parties might well restrict their
own internal uses to statistical purposes. In such
cases, the general guidelines previously stated
would follow, with the critical difference that
neither party could guarantee the performance
of the other with absolute certainty. Realisti-
cally, it must be assumed that actions by the
third party are administrative in character, and
may, indeed, entail results that are disadvan-
tageous to some respondents. The justification
for embarking on any activities in the CHSS that
include third parties of this type is based on cost
and efficiency; single collection and processing
seems reasonable when the third party has the
right to collect the same data that the first party
already has collected. Even so, the Center may
be prudent to take part in, at most, a limited
number of any such activities, for they almost
certainly put a strain on the NCHS image as a
purely statistical agency.
When such a cooperative survey is mounted,
several special steps must be taken:
1. The collector must make clear to the
respondent precisely who is to have
access to the microdata and for what
2,
3.
purposes. The respondent must under-
stand that he is authorizing transfer to
the other identified parties.
The collector must modify his assurances
of confidential handling. (See also “The
Self-Standing Direct Collection Sample
Survey” in this chapter.) He can con-
tinue to give very positive assurances
with respect to what his immediate
agency will do, but should avoid respon-
sibility for guaranteeing that the other
parties will do what they have promised.
Despite the precaution just stated, the
collector, before agreeing to the survey,
should secure, in writing, over the signa-
ture of the responsible official of the
second or third party, statements setting
forth the uses for the data and declaring
that the data will not be used by the
other part y.
Manpower components. –Some manpower
statistics will or may arise from enterprises that
meet the conditions described earlier, but for
others a differing protocol appears desirable in
the CHSS. As stated previously, confidentiality
should not be promised in data collection unless
needed data could be secured only with such a
promise, unless the absence of confidential
handling constituted a clear and unnecessary
invasion of privacy. The economy of single col-
lection with multiple dissemination of micro-
data, is also recognized if privacy is not unrea-
sonably invaded by such action. Many data on
health manpower are in the public domain
through registration and licensing bureaus,
schools, professional rosters, telephone director-
ies, and other sources. The CHSS can perform a
useful function in assembling this information in
convenient format and making it available to
any person or organization that has a need for
such information. For some purposes, statistical
aggregation is sufficient. For other objectives,
however, the “statistics” need to be classified
into such fine categories that privacy and confi-
dentiality cannot be assured.
In this situation, the preferred course for the
CHSS is not to consider most manpower. items
as “protected data” and not to give assurances
of confidentiality. Rather, the CHSS should
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declare that it is collecting and disseminating the
data as a service to the health community, not in
its role as a statistical system, but purely as an
agent peculiarly equipped to do an efficient job.
Precedents for such actions can be found in
instances in which the Census Bureau or the BLS
have acted as collecting agents for the Depart-
ment of Defense agencies. The exceptional
procedure for manpower data can be restricted
to items of information that do not infringe on
privacy. Included are such items as name,
address, professional classification, sex, and,
perhaps, other attributes. Information on more
sensitive items, such as income, age, race, nation-
ality, number of patients, and so forth, can be
secured separately through special surveys that
are accorded protected data status.
Two other considerations should be noted.
In one situation it is argued that for some items
of manpower information, good-quality data can
be secured for transmittal to Federal authorities
only if the transfer is in anonymous form. Yet
NCHS feels it must have a name or Social
Security number not to duplicate data that may
have been reported for the same person from
more than one local source. It is doubtful that
the first of these two premises has much
validity. If NCHS wished, however, it could
solve the duplication problem by simply re-
quiring that each person’s report include an item
stating the number of jurisdictions from which
the report might have come, if a census or
complete enumeration had been taken.
The second consideration is similar to the
caution that was urged in the section, “The
Cooperative Protected Data Sample Surve y“ in
this chapter, concerning access by third parties.
The policy and procedure suggested here for the
manpower component in the CHSS are foreign
to the main thrust of the cooperative statistical
system, They endanger, to some degree, public
confidence in the system. Therefore, this pattern
of operation should not be extended to any
other components of the system.
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CHAPTER XVI
TRAINING, PERCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS
Training in Ethical Standards
Whatever the laws and rules may be, what-
ever the structure of systems, whatever the
mechanics of operation—actions are taken by
people, and many are employees of the CHSS,
Perhaps the greatest single safeguard the system
can have is a knowledgeable workforce that
understands and is dedicated to conducting a
program that is equally balanced between assem-
bly and dissemination of useful statistical infor-
mation and appropriate protection of the pri-
vacy and confidence of those who supply the
information.
Whether it is the mark of impartiality, the
devotion to the quality of a product, or the
protection of confidentiality, the real strength
of such Federal statistical agencies as the Census
‘Bureau, the BLS, and the NCHS, and the better
structured State and private organizations, in the
last analysis, resides in the staff of those
agencies, In the Center, the staff believes in the
protection of confidentiality, and is dedicated to
it.
A series of steps should be taken to indoctri-
nate all the Cooperative Health Statistics System
personnel on the fundamental value and impor-
tance of confidentiality. These steps include (1)
dissemination of written materials, (2) work-
shops such as the one on Privacy and Confiden-
tiality in Atlanta, Ga., on March 3-5, 1976,
(3) several regional training sessions, and (4) cre-
ation in the National Center for Health Statistics
of a consultant on confidentiality to provide
service to States.
The objective of this effort is to create a
grass-root devotion to and advocacy of a sound
policy on confidentiality, and to avoid my
feeling among States that confidentiality is
simply another instance of burdensome Federal
regulations that must be tolerated.
Real and Perceived Situations
A continuing study of this topic points to
the importance of a pervasive phenomenon:
Despite significant philosophical differences be-
tween real and perceived situations in general, in
the field of confidentiality issues, these situa-
tions are intermingled or even indistinguishable.
Policy and practice need to be guided almost
as much by what people think the situation is as
by what the facts are. This state of affairs is the
consequence, in part, of deeply imbedded de-
sires and fears that people have concerning their
privacy, rights, privileges, and inhibitions being
misused. It also reflects the widespread public
impact of such matters as Watergate, the Ells-
berg break-in, questions about the activities of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Pen-
tagon Papers, tales about credit-rating bureaus,
the horror stories that have been detailed con-
cerning computers and databanks, and the even
more frightening forecasts in the book 1984. T In
other directions there are the cries of “freedom
of the press” and of the rights of patients,
students, and citizens to have access to informa-
tion about them that is held by physicians,
schools, and the Government,
An important consequence is the necessity
for NCHS, the CHSS, and others to devote
substantial energy to explaining the role of
statistical information in the world, and, in
particular, to a public relations program that
allays unjustified fears. This objective will be
enhanced by (1) making absolutely certain that
a straightforward presentation of intentions is
made to all concerned, and that those intentions
are fully honored; and (2) assembling and dis-
seminating only data for which there is definite
need, and for which the benefits outweigh the
burden on providers of the information.
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CHAPTER XVII
UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS AND LESSER ISSUES
Role of This Chapter
Earlier chapters of this report directed atten-
tion to basic fundamental concepts, principles,
and issues, and to derivative problems. Proposed
policy positions and suggested actions have been
offered for a variety of situations. This chapter
consists of supplementary material of two kinds:
(1) identification of related additional or pin-
pointed issues not fully resolved and (2) a partial
catalog of specific facets of the privacy, confi-
dentiality, and dissemination complex treated
superficially or, not at all, in earlier chapters.
Some problems are quite pertinent and impor-
tant. Others are intrinsically small, but their res-
olution may have reverberations that grow into
or merge with larger issues. The CHSS will prob-
ably not want to establish explicit guidelines for
treating each of the items in the list. However,
it is desirable to overlook none entirely when
policies and procedures are formulated. Order
of presentation has no particular significance.
Source data that s;rve both administrative
and statistical purposes. —This report has empha-
sized the distinction between protected data and
case-action data. One of the most vexing situa-
tions is when a single initial source record
becomes the basis for an administrative action
directly affecting an individual and an element
of a statistical body of data for which confi-
dentiality is promised. Satisfactory resolution of
this matter is critical. The problem consists of
the need for both sound procedures and for
public acceptance of those procedures. Policy
guidelines have been suggested for such situa-
tions in several parts of the report and especially
in “The Self-Standing Direct Collection Sample
Survey” and “The Cooperative Protected-Data
Sample Survey” in chapter XV, and “Definitions
and Labels” and “Use of Administrative Rec-
ords for Statistical Purposes” in chapter VI.
The report has not left the matter entirely
unresolved. Neither is it fully resolved–
particularly at the State level where a single
agency, at times, performs both statistical and
case-action functions. The key to a further
solution will lie in the drafting of procedural
rules for handling specific data sets, in taking
into consideration the many principles analyzed
in this report, and in promoting widespread
knowledge, understanding, and acceptance of
those rules.
Statistician’s access dilemma. –Each special
interest group-journalists, lawyers, physicians,
researchers, legislators, or statisticians—tends to
feel that it should have ready access to almost
any data source relevant to its perceived needs
and also be protected from forced disclosure to
other parties. In the CHSS, this attitude consti-
tutes an unresolved dilemma for the statistician.
The essence of the statistician’s position is this:
He should be given access to almost any needed
data because how he uses data gives society
valuable information without detriment to indi-
viduals or facilities; he should be immune from
compulsory release of privileged data in identifi-
able form because he could not acquire better
evidence, guarantee the absence of individual
detriment, or accomplish his mission. Not every-
one accepts this position; consequently, the
situation is less than ideal.
Statistical purposes. –In this report and else-
where, the expression “for statistical purposes
only” is widely used. Indeed, this concept is
fundamental to much that is herein recom-
mended. Statisticians believe they know the
meaning of the expression. Yet an unequivocal
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short definition, acceptable to all, is still
awaited. f Consider the following questions, for
example, to which the statistician can give




Is it an acceptable statistical purpose to
use names or addresses collected in one
enumeration as a sample in another
survey? The answer is “yes,” but see
limiting conditions in “Frame for Sam-
pling” in chapter VII.
Is it legitimate to link identifiable per-
sonal data from two surveys taken for
different purposes, even if the linked
data are not (easily) personally identifi-
able? The answer is again “yes,” but with
the provisos set forth in “Recapitula-
tion” in chapter IX.
Is it reasonable to release “statistics” for
a small area or a small class of persons if
the statistics show a rate or average for
the small cell that is dangerously unfa-
vorable to members of the cell, even
though data for an individual is not
released? Once more the answer is “yes,”
but again only in special circumstances
and when the value of the information
clearly outweighs the rights of potenti-
ally affected individuals.
Joint partnership versus purchase of data.-
In a fully cooperative joint partnership, all
partners have equal responsibilities and in gen-
eral are subject to the same governing rules. If
State Centers for Health Statistics and NCHS are
full partners in a joint system, then they maybe
subject to responsibilities for which no partner is
in a position to guarantee performance because
one partner does not have absolute control over
the others. Is a partial solution found in an
arrangement where a State collects and controls
handling of certain data for its own purposes,
fOne attractive comparison is made by Margaret E.
Martin, “Information to be used administratively usually
rwircs action on individual cases, . . . Statisticalinfor-
mation, on the other hand, is intended to be aggregated
or summarized in some form, and the specific identity
of [individual cases] is immaterial to the usefulness of
the results,”s
and then cooperatively sells a product to the
Federal Government? Is such a purchase of data
a dodge to avoid legal requirements?
Watchdog boards. –A safe prediction is that
whatever legislation is passed and whatever rules
are adopted, in some instances, the laws and
rules are disregarded or interpreted nonuni-
formly; and some situations will not be clearly
covered by the laws and rules. In these circum-
stances a disinterested monitoring or watchdog
board would be established to oversee govern-
mental performance and to settle citizen griev-
ances. However, if such boards were established,
their charters should be very carefully drafted.
They would have the potential either of suppres-
sing information that should be readily available
or of opening the gates so wide that confiden-
tiality would have little meaning. And certainly
they would contribute to time delays in resolv-
ing issues.
Additional facets. –The Iist of topics that
have relevance to privacy, confidentiality, and
dissemination of information is unending. This
final section is included not in any pretense of
completing a catalog of factors but in recogni-
tion that the full story extends beyond this
report, and brief allusion to some further ele-
ments can underscore that fact.
Not much has been said about quality of
data or quality control. This omission is not the
result of doubt or about their basic importance,
but is due to the fact that they are a separate
field and outside the primary scope of this
report. Two major intersections occur on the
subjects of quality and confidentiality of data.
The first is the conviction that the quality of
reported data is better when the respondents
and the persons to whom the data relate are
anonymous. The second intersection is that
most forms of quality control require access by
statisticians to a sample of individually identi-
fied cases to validate input to the system. A
collateral matter is the extent to which identifi-
able microdata should be made available to peers
to permit replicate treatment and verification
processes.
Physical security of data also has received
little attention in this report. Much has been
published elsewhere concerning this aspect. The
main reason for nondetailed treatment here is
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that physical’ security, although not to be
overlooked, is a relatively minor problem in the
CHSS. Existing laws, buttressed by modest
precautionary measures and rigorously enforced,
are probably sufficient. Although computers
open new channels for violating security, on
balance they are more likely to enhance se-
curity.
There have been many suggestions and some
pressure for NCHS to establish a death index;
that is, a national register of all deaths so that
anyone could consult the index to determine if a
death certificate had ever been filed for a
designated person. This is a borderline situation,
in which the CHSS and the Center could
perform a useful service for both researchers and
administrators—but with the risk of infringing
confidentiality, or at least the appearance of
doing so.
Chapter XV “Customized Variations of Pro-
cedure” advocated the concept of procedural
variation in certain situations and in several
dimensions. It is appropriate for differing kinds
of data, with such subjects as facilities, staff,
patients, residents, inmates, outpatients, provid-
ers, hospitalization, ambulatory care, emergency
care, births, deaths, dental data, fiscal matters,
costs, expenditures, and insurance. It is relevant
also to uses such as reference, planning, monitor-
ing, control, evaluation, databanking, case treat-
ment, workload, supply, utilization, demand,
inventory, standards, levels, trends, rates, rela-
tionships, unit costs, incidence, and prevalence.
Duration of confidentiality may be an im-
portant feature of policy. Should an assurance
of confidentiality extend into perpetuity? Or is
5, 10, or 50 years sufficient, or some other
period?
A closely allied matter, but still distinct, is
the question of retention of original or tr&-
scribed records. How long should they be kept
in active files, or in archival storage?
Are there special procedures that should be
invoked when data are collected by direct
observation without knowledge of the subject?
Is this ipso facto an invasion of privacy? Should
the CHSS allow or outlaw such practices?
There may be legitimate differences of opin-
ion over how completely frank interpersonal
relationships should be. There are some risks in
securing compliance and entirely truthful re-
sponse if the statistician explains ad nauseum
the reasons for and all conceivable uses of
requested information. However, in a democ-
racy, and especially in the currently prevailing
environment in the United States, it is expected
that Government will be forthright with citizens.
In most situations, a straightforward approach
by a collector to a provider of data, making clear
the reasons for a request and how the data will
be used, will result in compliance by the
possessor of the data–with the assumption that
there is a respectable justification for the collec-
tion. The Privacy Act of 1974, the DHEW Code
of Fair Information Practice, and various confer-
ences and professional bodies have declared a
need for a policy of openness in the acquisition,
handling, and dissemination of information. The
CHSS should embrace this policy–not only
because it must under the law, but also because
it will be a productive course.
The Decennial Population Census is taken
first for the purpose of apportioning congres-
sional representation among the States, but it
serves countless other purposes. The Census has
become preeminently a reference source that
describes the people who live in this country.
Similarly, data collected in the CHSS serve both
specific initial purposes and innumerable refer-
ence functions. Allocation of resources between
these latter baseline objectives and more immed-
iate specific purposes calls for a high order of
programmatic and managerial skills.
It has been argued in this report that the
CHSS should build an integrated policy and
practice in the realm of privacy, confidentiality,
and dissemination of data; and that the structure
must embrace ethical, political, economic, legis-
lative, and procedural considerations. However,
even this broad perspective is not enough. The
CHSS cannot stand alone on issues of privacy or
confidentiality, no more than it can in other
respects. Significant external developments and
activities—currently, and undoubtedly more in
the future–will have impact on the CHSS. One
needs to recall only a few to be impressed with
the potential consequences: regulations, rules,
and court decisions under the Freedom of
Information and Privacy Acts; the Study Com-
mission under the Privacy Act; the Paperwork
Commission; the Health Planning Act; possible
new legislation; PSRO actions; pronouncements
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of the National Commission on the Confidenti-
ality of and Access to Health Records; the 1975
Report of the Committee on Federal Agency
Evaluation Research of the National Academy
of Sciences, under the title, Protecting Individ-
ual Privacy in Evaluation Research;9 a report of
the Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality
of the American Statistical Association;l 0 the
report of the Research Project on Confidenti-
ality, sponsored by the American Political Sci-
ence Association and seven other organiza-
tions;1 1 and an international study of how to use
governmental statistics advantageously without
infringing confidentiality which was conducted
by investigators .at the University of Western
Ontario under a Ford Foundation grant.l 2
How to secure balance between the individ-
ual’s right to privacy and society’s need for
information is no new problem. It is receiving
vigorous attention on a wide front and from
many perspectives. Resolution for the CHSS is a
dynamic and evolutionary process that should
soon reach a degree of operational stability, but
for which no terminal point is foreseeable.
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S,$ri,’s 1. Programs and Collection Procedures. –Reports which describe the general programs of the National
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definitions and other material necessary for understanding the data.
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Sk’rics 4. Documents and Committee Reports. –Final reports of major committees concerned with vital and
health statistics and documents such as recommended model vital registration laws and revised birth
and death certificates.
Sertks 10. Data From the Health Interview Survey. –Statistics on illness, accidental injuries, disability, use of
hospital, medical, dental, and other services, and other health-related topics, all based on data collected
in a continuing national household interview survey.
St ’rit,s 11, Data From the Health Examination Survey and the Health and Nutrition Examination Survey .—Data
from direct examination, testing, and measurement of national samples of the civilian noninstitu-
tiormlized population provide the basis for two types of reports: (1) estimates of the medically defined
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St’rics 13. Data on Health Resources Utilization. –Statistics on the utilization of health manpower and facilities
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Series 2/2. Data on A40rtality. –Various statistics on mortality other than as included in regular annual or monthly
reports. Special analyses by cause of death, age, and other demographic variables; geographic and time
series analyses; and statistics on characteristics of deaths not available from the vital records based on
sample surveys of those records.
Series 21, Data on Natality, Marriage, and Divorce. —Various statistics on natality, marriage, and divorce other
than as included in regular annual or monthly reports. Special analyses by demographic variables;
geobwaphic and time series analyses; studies of fertility; and statistics on characteristics of births not
available from the vital records based on sample surveys of those records.
St’ri,’s 22, Data From the National Mortality and Natality Survey s.–Discontinued effective 1975. Future reports
from these sample surveys based on vital records will be included in Series 20 and 21, respectively.
st-rik~xz3, Data From the Natjonal Survey of Family Growth. –Statistics on fertility, family formation and dis-
sohttion, family planning, and related maternal and infant health topics derived from a biennial survey
of a nationwide probability sample of ever-married women 15-44 years of age.
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